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I. INTRODUCTION 
Throughout much of the world, the concept of comity has played a fundamental role in the 
shaping of modern private international law.1 Sometimes labelled as a “principle,” sometimes 
as a “doctrine,” it provided the foundation and informed the evolution of a number of rules of 
conflict.2 Granted, in many jurisdictions, comity gradually saw its importance fade as conflict 
came to be absorbed into the preserve of the domestic legislator.3 Scholarly attention declined 
too, prompting private international lawyers to dismiss comity as the flickering shimmer of a 
time long past, in the name of which courts would sometimes fine-tune the reach of their 
national substantive law and jurisdictional rules, refrain from questioning the lawfulness of 
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1  Thomas Schultz & David Holloway, Retour sur la comity, deuxième partie: La comity dans l’histoire du droit 
international privé,  J. DROIT INT. 571–595, 593–594 (2012). 
2 Elliott E. Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility,  HARV. LAW REV. 361–394, 363 
(1945); Donald Earl III Childress, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as Conflict of Laws, 44 UC 
DAVIS LAW REV. 11 (2010); William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUMBIA LAW REV. 
2071 (2015). 
3 Id. at 593–594. 
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another sovereign state’s acts, and restrict themselves from issuing such judgments and orders 
when to do so would have amounted to an unjustifiable interference.4 
But fading and disappearing, to paraphrase Charles I,5 are clean different things. Comity 
never really vanished, and has been invoked – as a principle, a doctrine, or unidentified 
institution – in a great number of cases, prompting scholars to observe that it was perhaps 
premature to pronounce its demise.6 Comity, as the English Lord Collins of Mapesbury put it, 
“may be a discredited concept in the eyes of the text-writers, but it thrives in the judicial 
decisions.”7 What is more, there is evidence that comity may have made a quiet comeback: 
References to the concept have been gradually increasing for some time in the decisions of 
certain courts, namely those of the United States of America.8 
To some, this peculiarity will not come as a surprise: Indeed, comity has long been 
acknowledged as a foundational principle—if not the foundation—of American conflict of laws.9 
A foundation whose importance cannot be fully understood without digging deep into a 
complex narrative, which unfolds in intertwined tales of misunderstandings, ethical battles, 
and nation-building efforts. 10  Further, while unique historical circumstances offered fertile 
ground for the concept of comity to adhere and prosper, changes in these conditions prompted 
the notion to evolve, perhaps transforming, at least to some degree, into “an expression of 
                                                
4 Adrian Briggs, The Principle of Comity in Private International Law, 354  in RECUEIL DES COURS DE L’ACADEMIE DE 
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 65, 85–86; Thomas Schultz & Niccolò Ridi, Comity and International Courts and Tribunals,  
FORTHCOMING. 
5 CHARLES I. (KING OF ENGLAND), HIS SPEECH MADE UPON THE SCAFFOLD AT WHITEHALL GATE, IMMEDIATELY 
BEFORE HIS EXECUTION, ON TUESDAY THE 30 OF JANUARY 1648: (1649). 
6 Thomas Schultz & Jason Mitchenson, Navigating Sovereignty and Transnational Commercial Law: The Use of Comity 
by Australian Courts, 12 JOURNAL OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 344 (2016). See also, generally, Briggs, supra 
note 4. 
7  Laurence Collins, Comity in Modern Private International Law, in REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR PETER NORTH , 95 (James Fawcett ed., 2002). 
8 As a general example, it can be added that a Westlaw search for “international comity” returned 1758 hits, of 
which 1295 concerned cases decided after 1995, and 782 after 2005. See also Donald Earl III Childress, Comity as 
Conflict: Resituating International Comity as Conflict of Laws, 44 UC DAVIS LAW REV. 11, 15 (2010). 
9 Joel R. Paul, Comity in international law, 32 HARV. INT. LAW J. 1, 78 (1991); Joel R. Paul, The Transformation of 
International Comity,  LAW CONTEMP. PROBL. 19–38, 19 (2008). 
10 See infra Section I.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2896960 
COMITY: THE NARRATIVE AND INFLUENCE OF A CORE AMERICAN CONCEPT 
 3 
unexplained authority, imprecise meaning and uncertain application.”11 It is certainly true that 
the term has come to refer to a variety of practices, many of which may rightly be considered 
conceptually distinct from its understanding, though they share with it “certain methods, 
values, and justificatory rhetoric.”12 
Be that as it may, it is undeniable that no legal system has given as much weight to the 
notion of comity as that of the United States of America: Its tumultuous history and peculiar 
development, in and by themselves, well warrants an in-depth study of the life of the concept in 
the USA. While the topic is discussed in a number of studies, most of them fail to consider the 
phenomenon in a broader dimension and thus do not properly appraise the peculiarity of the 
American understanding of the comity.13 
But there is one more, equally compelling reason that prompts us to carry out this 
investigation: Legal ideas circulate today much in the same way they did in the early 
Nineteenth Century, when Justice Joseph Story relied on the authority of the Dutch jurist 
Ulrich Huber to write his influential Commentaries.14 Inevitably, the American understanding 
of comity has proved persuasive. It has affected the development of legal doctrines elsewhere, 
and stimulated further reflection on the role of the concept, especially when employed by 
prominent American scholars.15 This has in turn prompted the revitalization of comity as a tool 
capable of alleviating problems of a global nature.16  
                                                
11 Michael D Ramsey, Escaping“ International Comity,” 83 IOWA LAW REV. 893, 893 (1997). 
12 Paul, supra note 6, at 21. 
13 Indeed, comity has been the object of three major studies, the findings of which the present article builds upon. 
See Paul, supra note 11; Childress, supra note 4; Dodge, supra note 4. 
14  JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC: IN REGARD TO 
CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES, AND ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, WILLS, SUCCESSIONS, 
AND JUDGMENTS (1834) § 29 ff. 
15 Above all ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 67 (2004). 
16 See for example YUVAL SHANY, THE COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 
(2003); Elisa D’Alterio, From judicial comity to legal comity: A judicial solution to global disorder?, 9 INT. J. CONST. LAW 
394 (2011). 
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The purpose of this study is thus, first, to contribute to the elucidation of the notion of 
comity as it is understood by American scholars and practitioners, and to illustrate the 
distinctiveness of this American understanding.  Our research builds upon the existing 
literature and an extensive survey of Supreme Court and Federal Appellate decisions, covering 
more than two centuries’ worth of judicial reasoning. Through our analysis, we aim to provide 
an account of how comity and its localised understanding evolved to meet unique historical 
and political circumstances. Accordingly, we will explore the significance of the notion—or, 
more correctly, several notions—of comity in shaping the American understanding of conflict, 
foreign relations law, and the concept of public international law jurisdiction.17 We will then 
proceed to assess the degree to which the American understanding of comity has, by reason of 
its isolated development, influenced related doctrines elsewhere. 
II. THE PROBLEM OF COMITY: DEFINITIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
A. Acknowledging comity and defining it 
Let us start from the beginning: Even by the most conservative assessment, the notion of 
comity is employed by nearly every common law court to an extent that is not negligible. Yet, 
there is comparatively little agreement as to what exactly comity is, what purposes it should 
serve and when and how it should operate. The problem is a significant one: On the one hand, 
certain commentators tend to be adamantly dismissive of the notion—which, it should be 
pointed out, is quite unhelpful, as the notion does not for this reason cease to exist and be 
                                                
17 On the relationship between private international law and the concept of jurisdiction in public international 
law, see ALEX MILLS, THE CONFLUENCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE, PLURALISM AND 
SUBSIDIARITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERING OF PRIVATE LAW 226–246, 303 (2009); CEDRIC 
RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 157 (2008). 
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employed.18  But even among those who do express a degree of interest and devote some 
scholarly attention to comity, views tend to diverge significantly.19 What is more, definition 
attempts seem to be doomed at the outset, to the point that one of the leading British conflicts 
of law scholars dodged the question by first explaining what comity is not, and then attempting 
to provide a rather lengthy list of the concept’s distinctive characteristics.20 
A casual reader could be forgiven for playing down the importance of defining comity as 
yet another purely academic quest. All the same, such a reader would be mistaken. What is a 
stake here is the answer to significant questions, such as: which law should apply to a given 
dispute; whether a court should be able to decline to exercise its jurisdiction; and what 
consequences should be attached to the sovereign status (or sovereign capacity) of a party to a 
dispute. It is disingenuous to think that the solution to these problems would be 
straightforward if the answer must be based—at least to some extent—on a notion so vaguely 
defined that it “invites intuitive adjudication, and hence litigation-inspiring ex ante 
unpredictability.”21 And yet, it is arguable that the notion of comity is quite underserving of the 
measure of criticisms that it has received. Indeed, if it is so indeterminate, the impudent 
question could—with good reason—arise of how generations of common law judges managed to 
live with concepts as abstract as those of “equity” and “due process.”22 Still, comity is treated 
with mistrust, and many have sought to look beyond the word’s “deceptively right ring, like 
good breeding and sweet disposition.”23 Indeed, according to Andreas Lowenfeld, the wariness 
was such that the reporters of the Third Restatement on Foreign Relations Law avoided the 
                                                
18 CHESHIRE, NORTH & FAWCETT: PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 5 (James Fawcett et al. eds., 14th ed. 2008); See 
also, generally Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEO LJ 53 (1991); Ramsey, supra note 13. 
19 See infra, section IV. 
20 Briggs, supra note 4 at 87, 180. 
21 Ramsey, supra note 13 at 894. 
22 See the discussion in N. Jansen Calamita, Rethinking Comity: Towards a Coherent Treatment of International Parallel 
Proceedings, 27 U PA J INTL ECON L 601, 626 (2006). 
23 Weinberg, supra note 20 at 59. 
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word altogether, believing it too charged of “the idea of discretion or even political judgment,” 
preferring “reasonableness, which is conceived in terms of legal obligation.”24 
It is perhaps for this reason that most American scholars discussing the subject attempt 
to anchor the discussion to formally strong authority: the definition of comity offered in the 
early landmark case Hilton v. Guyot. In the words of Justice Gray, comity 
in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere 
courtesy and goodwill, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within 
its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both 
to international duty and convenience and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons 
was are under the protection of its laws.25 
The influence of this definition, quite possibly the most cited in scholarly and judicial 
writing far beyond the American panorama, is immeasurable.26 It is thus unsurprising that 
American scholars would accept it — although with varying degrees of criticism and different 
adjustments. For example, Harold Koh’s monumental work on transnational litigation pays 
homage to this description, but clarifies that comity “flows from the respect that one sovereign 
is obliged to give to the sovereign acts of a coequal nation-state.”27 It adds that the notion has 
been increasingly interpreted by American courts “as a reason why they should refrain from 
independent determination of cases under the law of nations.”28 This statement, while not 
particularly helpful, has the merit of framing the issue in the broader perspective of a discourse 
on sovereignty and the allocation of regulatory authority. Indeed, as we will further discuss in 
                                                
24 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403, Andreas F. Lowenfeld, 
Conflict, Balancing of Interests, and the Exercise of Jurisdiction to Prescribe: Reflections on the Insurance Antitrust Case,  AM. 
J. INT. LAW 42–53, 52 (1995); Paul, supra note 11 at 29. 
25 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).  
26 Calamita, supra note 24 at 626. 
27 HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 19 (2008). 
28 ibid. 
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Part III, comity is very much a predicate of the modern model of sovereignty and — more 
specifically — the idea of sovereign equality, as well as a parallel to the evolution of the 
international law on jurisdiction.29  
This connection introduces one further significant problem, that is, what relevance 
should be attributed to the historical origin of the principle or to its connection with other 
notions (such as that of state jurisdiction). In other words, this is the question of whether a 
better understanding of how comity came to develop or a contextual awareness of a number of 
related notions may contribute to shedding light on its current use.30 Depending on the answer 
to this question, the discussion on comity generally focuses on its value as a general, 
overarching principle of private international law,31 or — abandoning “the language of the 
comity of sovereigns” and looking at the lower level of “what judges do and why they do it” — 
as a judicial tool.32 In fact, whether the problem of comity can be resolved by rigidly sticking to 
either end of the spectrum is doubtful at best: The notion tenaciously resists traditional 
definition efforts, based on gradual abstraction aimed at establishing its essence, as it seems to 
have countless meanings. It is precisely for this reason that discussion on the doctrine ends up 
focusing on what comity does — and has done — rather than what it is. 
B. The judicial understanding of comity: methodological remarks 
According to Adrian Briggs, “legal thinking in the United States, from the earliest days to 
modern  times, has found the principle of comity to be of assistance in getting the judge to the 
                                                
29 As a leading scholar of public international law put it, “[c]omity arises from the horizontal arrangement of state 
jurisdictions”: JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 485 (8 edition ed. 
2012); Dodge, supra note 4. 
30 On this point see Calamita, supra note 24 at 606 As the author argues, “the historic, common law principles of 
comity - in particular adjudicatory comity - are the very same principles that underlie current case law”. 
31 See inter alia Childress, supra note 4.  
32 Briggs, supra note 4 at 89. 
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point where a case is decided.”33 While this remark might perhaps overlook other roles of 
comity, it seems to accurately describe the use of the principle by American courts: A cursory 
search on any major database reveals a large number of mentions of comity in judicial 
decisions, which is hard to reconcile with the principle’s alleged demise. The table below shows 
the number of hits for different search operators. Our dataset included 104 Supreme Court 
cases and many Federal Appellate decisions. For Supreme Court cases, we employed Westlaw 
and LexisNexis to build a preliminary sample of all the decisions in which the term “comity” 
appeared; we then proceeded to discard the ones in which the word was employed in a purely 
domestic context. For Federal Court decisions, the same methodology could not be employed, 
as the results yielded by database searches were in a whole different order of magnitude – tens 
of thousands. Accordingly, we have elected to rely on a combination of Westlaw search 
operator, West key numbers, and frequency of citation in other decisions and scholarly pieces 
to identify a number of significant and influential rulings. 
 
 
“Comity” 
(unrestricted) 
“Comity” 
(1995-) 
“Comity” 
(2005-) 
“International 
Comity” 
“International 
Comity” (1995-) 
International Comity 
(2005-) 
SCOTUS 639 115 50 44 9 5 
CTA 7,159 3046 1425 472 300 163 
District 
Court 10000+ 10000+ 10000+ 1093 911 573 
All Federal 10000+ 10000+ 10000+ 1758 1295 782 
 
 
"Comity" & "International" 
(unrestricted) 
"Comity" & "International" 
(1995-) 
"Comity" & "International" 
(2005-)34 
SCOTUS 212 48 24 
CTA 1995 1068 525 
District Courts 7465 6010 4322 
                                                
33 Id. at 78. 
34 The search for “comity” and “international” was devised with the goal of avoiding searching for “international 
comity” only. While the search has yielded a number of false positives, it has revealed a number of cases in which 
instances of “international comity” had been labelled with the simple mention of “comity”.  
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All Federal 10000+ 7590 5147 
 
True, these numbers, while telling, do not necessarily expose the whole picture: Indeed, 
in a very significant number of cases courts employ the term to refer to “other” comity 
doctrines, which are wholly domestic in nature and arise from the complex relationship 
between state and federal institutions that inform the law of the United States. 35  These 
doctrines are beyond the scope of the present article, which focuses instead on the uses of 
comity in cases where an “international” element is present – in which “cross-border elements 
are in need of careful treatment.”36 It follows that this study will focus on federal decisions, 
much more likely to concern disputes in which the “cross-border elements” are truly 
international in nature. Such inevitable constraints, however, must not be perceived as a 
limitation, all the more so in a study concerned with the elucidation of a legal concept in a 
system where federal judges have long been identified as the main interpretive community.37 
                                                
35 On the topic, see Michael Wells, Role of Comity in the Law of Federal Courts, The, 60 NCL REV 59 (1981); Gil 
Seinfeld, Reflections on Comity in the Law of American Federalism, 90 NOTRE DAME REV 1309 (2014). 
36 Briggs, supra note 4 at 89; It could be objected that a domestic context should not automatically exclude the 
relevance of comity. This objection has some merit, but only insofar as a historical perspective is adopted: after all, 
much of the reflection on the topic was prompted by conflicts between the policies and legislations of American 
federate states. Story himself thought as much when he wrote that the issue of the application of foreign law was 
of paramount importance in the United States, “since the union of a national government with that of twenty-
four distinct, and in some respects independent states, necessarily creates very complicated relations and rights 
between the citizens of those states, which call for the constant administration of extra-municipal principles”: 
STORY, supra note 16§ 9. While the current degree of integration is much greater today than it was in Story’s day, 
early reflection on the role of comity in this context is taken into account to properly explain the history of the 
principle. 
37 Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State,  HARV. LAW REV. 405–508, 405, 413 (1989). 
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III. THE HISTORY OF COMITY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THINKING 
A. Comity enters the United States 
1. The sister notions of comity and sovereignty 
Comity, it has been observed, “is a concept with almost as many meanings as sovereignty.”38 
This comparison is not accidental: Comity developed as a corollary of the invention of the 
concept of sovereignty, and the history of the former is very much an account of the latter’s 
creation, only told from a different perspective.39 
The two narratives share the same starting point: the development of the Westphalian 
system. The consecration of the principles of territorial sovereignty and freedom from 
interference made personal statuses irrelevant in the face of the territorial law of the state. 
Compared to the previous approach, epitomized by the likelihood of witnessing a meeting 
between five men with no one law in common, this no doubt represented a fundamental 
shift.40 Sovereign independence and non-interference served as the building blocks of the new 
world order,41 but proved to be at variance with the transnational relations that formed the 
backbone of seventeenth-century European society and commerce.42 It comes as no surprise 
that the doctrine of comity, meant to mitigate the adverse effect of strict territoriality, would 
develop in the Netherlands, a country that had much to lose from this tension. Following their 
                                                
38 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Court to Court,  AM. J. INT. LAW 708, 708 (1998). 
39 KURT LIPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 8 (1981); Thomas 
Schultz & David Holloway, Retour sur la comity (Première partie),  J. DROIT INT. 863–866 (2011); Schultz and 
Holloway, supra note 3 at 571, 574. Thomas Schultz and Niccolò Ridi, ‘Comity and International Courts and 
Tribunals’, forthcoming. 
40  Hessel Yntema recounts the complaint of Saint Agobard against the lex Gundobadi of Burgundy: “Nam 
plerumque contingit ut simul eant aut sedeant quinque homines et nullus eorum communem legem cum altero 
habeat... Indeed, it frequently happens that five men get together or meet with each other and none of them has a 
law in common with any other.” Hessel E. Yntema, The Comity Doctrine,  MICH. LAW REV. 9–32, 10 (1966). 
41 Harold G. Maier, Resolving Extraterritorial Conflicts, or There and Back Again, 25 VA J INTL L 7, 10 (1984). 
42 RODOLFO DE NOVA, HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION TO CONFLICT OF LAWS 435, 441 (1966); 
Schultz and Ridi, supra note 6. 
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independence from Spanish rule and their unification, the Low Countries found themselves in 
need of coping with the effects of territorial sovereignty: On the one hand, a weak central 
power left the provinces’ jealousy of their different traditions, laws, and original privileges 
relatively unbridled. On the other hand, the Netherlands had become a major maritime and 
commercial power, and were mindful of the need to accord a favorable treatment to 
foreigners.43 This context offered the ideal combination of “difference and deference,” 44 thus 
providing fertile ground for the need of rules capable of governing the allocation of regulatory 
authority.45  
In the end, the question affected one fundamental problem, that of which law should 
govern a specific private legal relationship. It was in these circumstances that jurists such as 
Paulus Voet, his son Johannes, and, most notably, Ulrich Huber developed theories — new 
theories — to provide an answer to the conundrum.46 These scholars, however, were mindful of 
the general importance of the issue: As Rodolfo de Nova points out, they did not seek to 
present their work as mere suggestions to Dutch courts, but rather as a new model with 
universal validity.47 
The doctrine of comity was introduced, in a fairly primitive form, by Paulus Voet in a 
work published in 1661.48 The learned treatise, “couched in a concise and sometimes crabbed 
style in the form of a catechism of questions and answers,”49 conceived comity as a technique 
for mitigating the adverse effects of the inherent territoriality of statutes. In other words, the 
doctrine allowed states to give effect and recognition — ex comitate — to transactions concluded 
                                                
43 Yntema, supra note 42 at 19. 
44 MILLS, supra note 19 at 45–46. 
45 Yntema, supra note 42 at 17; Paul, supra note 11 at 15. 
46 Arthur Nussbaum, Rise and Decline of the Law-of-Nations Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws, 42 COLUMBIA LAW REV. 
189–206, 190 (1942). 
47 DE NOVA, supra note 44 at 449. 
48 PAULUS VOET, DE STATUTIS EORUMQUE CONCURSU LIBER SINGULARIS 156 (1661). 
49 Yntema, supra note 42 at 22. 
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outside the borders of the state concerned. Voet’s theory seems to suggest that such recognition 
was to be considered fully discretionary. What is more, comity, in this sense, did not “so much 
operate as a constraint on the (extraterritorial) application of a forum State’s law… but rather as 
a constraint on the exclusive territorial application of the forum State’s law.”50 The point is 
worth mentioning because, almost forty years later, Paulus Voet’s son, Johannes, stressed the 
importance of the fact that the extension of statutes beyond the territorial domain of a state 
was not constrained by any particular rule.51 In his restatement of his father’s doctrine, comity 
served the purpose of  preserving “the primacy of the statute real, subject to such concessions as 
might be made by one nation to another.”52 In other words, the doctrine proved essential for 
the reconciliation of two diverging paradigms, but its application remained — at least at first 
glance — fundamentally discretionary.53  
When the history of comity is so presented, one could be forgiven to read the work of 
the Dutch theorists as dismissing the old, universalist — or “international”— approach to 
questions of conflict of laws with a view to endorsing an attitude more consistent with the 
model of territorial sovereignty. In fact, as early as 1966 De Nova denounced such a conclusion 
as injudicious.54 The tenuousness of the discretion thesis appears even more evident by reading 
the magnum opus of the most influential writer of the time on the topic of comity, Ulrik 
Huber’s De conflictu legum.55 One of the leading jurists of his day, Huber too devoted significant 
attention to the topic of the application of foreign law. Most notably, Huber formulated an 
                                                
50 RYNGAERT, supra note 19 at 150. 
51 JOHANNES VOET, COMMENTARIUS AD PANDECTAS. (1698). 
52 Yntema, supra note 42 at 24. 
53 Schultz and Holloway, supra note 3 at 579. 
54 DE NOVA, supra note 44 at 449–450. 
55 The original text can be found in Ernest Gustav Lorenzen, Huber’s De Conflictu Legum,  in SELECTED ARTICLES 
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1947) It reads: “Rectores imperiorum id comiter agunt, ut cujusque populi intra 
terminos ejus exercita, teneant ubique suam vim, quatenus nihil potentati aut juri alterius impetrantes ejusque 
civium prejudicetur”; See also Ernest G. Lorenzen, Story’s Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws: One Hundred Years 
after,  HARV. LAW REV. 15–38, 16 (1934); Paul, supra note 11 at 15; Schultz and Holloway, supra note 3 at 577. 
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elegant solution by the use of three “axioms,” the normativity of which remains a controversial 
issue in the modern debate on the doctrine of comity. He wrote: 
(1) The laws of each state have force within the limits of that government and bind all subject to 
it, but not beyond. (2) All person within the limits of a government, whether they live there 
permanently or temporarily, are deemed to be subjects thereof. (3) Sovereigns will so act by way 
of comity that rights acquired within the limits of a government retain their force everywhere so 
far as they do not cause prejudice to the power or rights of such governments or of its subjects.56 
The third axiom has long represented a controversial point:57 What did Huber actually 
mean? What kind of discretion did he envisage for a sovereign and its courts? What was the 
nature and cogency of the obligation — provided that there was any — to apply foreign law? 
Huber’s work does not, in and by itself, provide simple answers to these hoary questions: But 
were they really appropriate to begin with? Two main points suggest otherwise. 
First of all, Huber never employed the word comitas, let alone the expression comitas 
gentium (‘the comity of nations’), but restricted himself to choosing an adverbial — and possibly 
less charged — form, comiter, which —it is worth recalling— had been adopted by Paulus Voet.58 
The language adopted in the Dutch edition does not even mention any such term: Acutely 
aware of the importance of ensuring the smoothness of business transactions, Huber supports 
the discussion with the allegorical image of governments extending a hand to each other.59 
While linguistic exegesis can only play a small role in legal scholarship, this small detail may 
contribute to the clarification of the original doctrine. In particular, it allows the concept of 
                                                
56 Lorenzen, supra note 57 at 403. 
57 See the discussion in Llewelyn Davies, The Influence of Huber’s De Conflictu Legum on English Private International 
Law, 18 BR. YEARB. INT. LAW 49 (1937); Lorenzen, supra note 57; Yntema, supra note 42; ALAN WATSON, JOSEPH 
STORY AND THE COMITY OF ERRORS: A CASE STUDY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS 28 ff (1992). 
58 See for example VOET, supra note 50 at 143, 168; While Huber’s work was publised before Johannes Voet’s 
Commentarius, he was undoubtedly familiar with the work of Paulus. See Yntema, supra note 42 at 29 ff. 
59 Schultz and Holloway, supra note 3 at 580. 
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comity to be revealed as the cornerstone of the building, rather than the building itself and as a 
whole. The point was lucidly highlighted by Campbell McLachlan:  
Huber, Voet and those the jurists that followed them… used the concept of comity as a 
springboard from which they proceeded to develop a highly organized and sophisticated set of 
choice of law rules. In this sense, “comity” did not remain a vague desideratum – an invitation to 
replace law with its antithesis in mere courtesy and discretion. On the contrary, it supplied the 
basis for the elaboration of a detailed set of positive rules, grounded in practical reality.60  
Indeed, the system at issue could not be faulted as primitive: The Dutch jurists did 
develop fairly advanced rules, which we might, with a modern mind-set, define as rules of 
private international law. As is well known, due to the rise of positivism, the whole field of 
conflict was being drawn into the preserve of the national legislator. And yet, the 
understanding of comity outlined above allows the reconciliation of its value with the idea of 
territoriality and the doctrine of supremacy of sovereign command.61 Comity, in other words, 
can be considered the conceptual basis of the rules, rather than their formal source. The 
modern idea of the doctrine as necessitating exercises of discretion by a court does not follow 
directly from the essence of the principle. 
The second point follows from the observation that Huber’s conception of international 
law was fundamentally a Grotian one.62 His third axiom spells out an international usage — if 
not an international custom63 — whereby “the effects of competent foreign laws are everywhere 
admitted, except when prejudicial to the forum State or its citizens, through the reciprocal 
                                                
60 CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, LIS PENDENS IN INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION 223 (2009) (emphasis added). 
61 The expression is, of course, a reference to Austin’s theoretical construction: see JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE 
OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832). 
62 There is no question that Huber was familiar with Grotius, whom he cites in De Conflictu Legum too. See 
Lorenzen, supra note 38; See also Schultz and Holloway, supra note 1, at 578 
63 Note the Grotian expression “tacito populorum consensu” in § 1 of De Conflictu Legum. See the Latin wording 
in Lorenzen, supra note 57. 
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indulgence of the sovereign authorities in each State.”64 This is no small detail: on the one 
hand, reliance on the jus gentium allowed Huber to universalize his maxims; on the other hand, 
it lends credibility to the view that Huber’s axioms were, at least to some extent, descriptive of 
then-current practices, and anticipative of their consolidation — which would have, in turn, 
yielded normative consequences — rather than simply prescriptive.  
In this respect, remarks such as Dicey’s celebrated discussion on the application of 
foreign law as having little to do with courtesy between sovereigns fail to make the grade as a 
subtle critique of Huber.65 Indeed, convenience and logic, rather than mere courtesy, were the 
goals with which the Dutch theorist was concerned — very much the same objectives that Dicey 
saw as best pursued without relying on his characteristic theoretical construct.66 Needless to say, 
this was not the way Huber’s ideas were received in the common law world, where his writings 
eventually made an impact, due to unique circumstances, on the minds of students and 
practitioners of the law.67 The scholar’s name became a shorthand to make a point on the 
supremacy of the forum’s law, in a corruption of the doctrine that was to a great extent a 
corruption of his legacy. 
2. Comity in the United States: Livermore, Kent and Story 
When the concept is conceived as the basis of certain rules, Samuel Livermore’s famous 
description of the expression “comity” as something “grating to the ear when it proceeds from 
a court of law” seems quite unfair and one-sided. “Comity between nations,” Livermore wrote, 
“is to be exercised by those who administer the supreme power. The duty of judges is to 
administer justice according to law, and decide between parties litigant according to their 
                                                
64 Yntema, supra note 42 at 30. 
65 ALBERT VENN DICEY, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE TO THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 10 
(1896). 
66 Id. at 10. 
67 Davies, supra note 59 at 53; Schultz and Holloway, supra note 41 at 91. 
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rights.” And yet, Livermore and his passionate discussion of a point of law he regarded as 
fundamental played no small part in prompting a reconsideration of the concept of comity and 
the Dutch theories. But how did this happen? 
According to Alan Watson, much can be traced back to the anger that Livermore, an 
influential attorney of civil-law Louisiana, felt towards the Anglo-American reliance on the 
Dutch jurists, and to his personal resentment against the judge who authored an influential 
opinion on conflict in a case where he happened to find himself on the losing side.68 It has 
been argued that Livermore saw comity as allowing excessive discretion – a discretion, in other 
words, that international law did not allow.69 Quite interestingly, he appeared rather ignorant 
and disdainful of Huber, whose authority may well have supported his thesis. 70  Whether 
Livermore’s view really was based on international law properly-so-called is at best doubtful: In 
his oft-cited Dissertations, he motivated the necessity of applying foreign law by reference to “a 
sense of mutual utility,” “arisen from a sort of necessity” and “the inconveniences which would 
result from a contrary doctrine.”71 There is no question, however, that Livermore believed that 
the application of foreign law was conducive to maintaining peace, friendly intercourse, and 
even to “the general good”: in that, it would have pursued in the private sphere the same 
objective that the law of nations pursued in the public one.72 
This treatment of comity and of the Dutch jurists’ theories was perhaps unsophisticated, but 
proved influential. True, it was only with Joseph Story’s work that comity eventually became an 
important element of the interface between public international law and American conflict of 
                                                
68 WATSON, supra note 59 at 28–33. Saul v. His Creditors, 5 Mart. 569 (La. 1827).  
69 Paul, supra note 11 at 24; Paul, supra note 11 at 21; The expression in question is “something like an obligation 
upon sovereigns” SAMUEL LIVERMORE, DISSERTATIONS ON THE QUESTIONS WHICH ARISE FROM THE CONTRARIETY 
OF THE POSITIVE LAWS OF DIFFERENT STATES AND NATIONS (1828)30. 
70 WATSON, supra note 59 at 32–33. 
71 LIVERMORE, supra note 71 at 28; Compare with the language adopted by STORY, supra note 16§ 35. 
72 LIVERMORE, supra note 71 at 30; In this regard, the theory is not too far away from Minor’s famous reference to 
comity as the basis of international law: RALEIGH C. MINOR, CONFLICT OF LAWS, OR, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 5 (1901). 
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laws. However, Livermore’s treatise, along with the case that prompted its creation, was quoted 
in the influential work of James Kent,73 to whom Joseph Story felt intellectually indebted.74 
And indeed, not unlike Kent, the learned jurist felt that the issue was one of central 
importance for the management of frictions resulting from radically different state policies.75 
The issue of slavery was, of course, a central one.76  
Story insisted that no national law could have, in principle, extraterritorial effect: In his 
view, this conclusion was the natural consequence of public law principles, and was also 
supported by Vattel’s writings on the sovereign equality of nations in the field of public 
international law.77 “This branch of public law,” he wrote in his Commentaries, “may be fitly 
denominated private international law.”78 But Story’s adherence to this view should not be 
mistaken for a belief that the application of foreign law descended from some perfect 
international obligation – in fact, his reliance on Huber’s theories, which may well have 
                                                
73 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (1826) In reality, Kent attributed the work to Livermore with 
the title “Dissertations on Personal and Real Statutes”, a corruption of the title of an earlier work, by the British 
scholar Henry, titled “Dissertation on Personal, Real and Mixed Statutes”. Story, however, cites both authorities 
correctly STORY, supra note 16. 
74 WATSON, supra note 59 at 27–28. 
75 See for example the following passage: “To no part of the world is it of more interest and importance than to 
the United States, since the union of a national government with that of twenty-four distinct, and in some 
respects independent states, necessarily creates very complicated relations and rights between the citizens of those 
states, which call for the constant administration of extra-municipal principles.” STORY, supra note 16§ 9. 
76 See generally PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY (2013); DODGE, 
supra note 31 at 19. See also Story’s opinion in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842).  
77 STORY, supra note 16§ 8. Consider the influence of this dictum in Hilton and Guyot: “International law, in its 
widest and most comprehensive sense-including not only questions of right between nations, governed by what 
has been appropriately called the law of nations; but also questions arising under what is usually called private 
international law, or the conflict of laws, and concerning the rights of persons within the territory and dominion 
of one nation, by reason of acts, private or public, done within the dominions of another nation-is part of our law, 
and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice, as often as such questions are presented in 
litigation between man and man, duly submitted to their determination.” 159 U.S. 113 (1895) at 163. 
78 Id.§ 9; A citation of Vattel and Huber in the same decision might appear surprising to the modern reader. It 
was, however, hardly surprising at the time, nor was it unprecedented. For example, the authority of both Huber 
and Vattel was cited in Denesbas v. Berquier, an 1808 Pennsylvania conflicts case relating to personal property 
under a will. Indeed, this constitutes another indication of the perceived contiguity—or, more precisely, of the 
absence of any real separation—of public and private international law. See WATSON, supra note 59 at 51; For an 
analysis of the issues concerning the questions concerning the unity of private and public international law see 
MILLS, supra note 19.  
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supported very different conclusions, has been described as the result of a misunderstanding.79 
Indeed, it is often argued that, to the Dutch theorist, the application of foreign law had a 
wholly different degree of bindingness. 80  To the American jurist, the state retained the 
fundamental ability to decide whether to give effect to foreign law: There was no duty to do so, 
but more of an “imperfect obligation, like that of beneficence, humanity or charity.”81 “Every 
nation,” he continued, “must be the final judge for itself, not only of the nature and extent of 
the duty, but of the occasions, on which its exercise may be justly demanded.”82 An imperfect 
obligation indeed, which derived “from mutual interest and utility, from a sense of the 
inconveniences” “which would result from a contrary doctrine.”83  
The centrality of state discretion in Story’s treatment comity is the crucial issue — indeed, 
one that makes Watson’s claim that he did, to some extent, misinterpret Huber seem not too 
harsh an assessment.84 The point is not the claim that the predominance of Story’s authority 
over Huber’s altered the outcome of cases such as the infamous Dred Scott v. Sandford85 due to 
the possibility — consistent with the former’s theory, but not with the latter’s — of exercising a 
choice as to which law to apply.86 In fact, the point is the very centrality of the concept of 
discretion in Story’s theory. As Joel Paul observed, Story’s solution was an exceptionally elegant 
                                                
79 For an in-depth analysis of the issue see WATSON, supra note 59. 
80 Yntema, supra note 42 at 29 (arguing that Huber saw the extraterritorial extension of statutes as mandated by 
the jus gentium); Davies, supra note 59 at 57; For a powerful rejection of the idea whereby comity should be the 
source of a perfect obligation to apply foreign law see Calamita, supra note 24 at 617. 
81 STORY, supra note 16§ 33. 
82 Id.§ 33. 
83 Id.§ 33; LIVERMORE, supra note 71 at 28. 
84 On the reasons why a misunderstanding seems a more viable hypothesis than an deliberate, if subtle, rejection 
see WATSON, supra note 59 at 72. 
85 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
86 This conclusion is grounded on § 3 of Huber’s De Conflictu Legum, where it is said that “all transactions and 
acts, in court as well as out, whether mortis causa or inter vivos, rightly done accordining to the law of any 
particular place, are valid even where a different law prevails, and where, had they been so done, they would not 
have been valid.” Lorenzen, supra note 57 at 404. Watson also observes that in case concerning slavery, the law of 
a slave-owning state could not be rejected on the basis of its being revolting, as Huber’s third axiom would be 
intimately linked to the law of nations, which ostensibly did not yet contain a prohibition to that effect: WATSON, 
supra note 59 at 64. It is arguable that this inference amounts to reading too much in § 8 of De Conflictu Legum. 
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one, as it managed to universalize conflict and, at the same time, reflect his policy concerns by 
affirming the primacy of the forum’s law. What is more, this thesis was in line with the rise of 
positivism – a characteristic that helped it survive and further develop in the American 
setting.87 
Given the popularity of his writings and the impact that they had on subsequent cases, a 
discussion of Story’s engagement with the idea of comity has traditionally represented the ideal 
dénouement of an historical analysis of the concept — virtually all the studies cited in this article 
prove as much. There are good reasons to respect the tradition: Upon publication of the 
Commentaries, Story became the main authority on the issue of comity, and his legacy was — at 
least formally — very much alive one century and a half later.88 At the same time, it must be 
stressed that it is unthinkable to resolve cases involving comity considerations with the simple 
application of Story’s maxims. Comity — not unlike its parent concept, sovereignty — is 
inherently context-dependent. Its meaning and implications, as we seek to elucidate in the next 
sections, transformed as a reflection of the changes in the status quo. Such shift is investigated 
in the following sections, under the lens provided by almost two centuries of judicial decision-
making.  
IV. THE JUDICIAL EVOLUTION OF COMITY 
A.  “Legislative” or “prescriptive” comity: restraint and recognition 
The history of comity, as we have seen above, clearly shows that the principle was borne out of 
the need to make sense of a new model of allocation of regulatory authority. With a central 
                                                
87 Paul, supra note 11 at 25. 
88 See the citation of the Commentaries in Justice Scalia’s dissent in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 
764, 817 (1993). 
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role played by the principle of territoriality, coupled with the need to cater to the needs of 
commerce and friendly relations, comity proved successful as a flexible mediating principle.  
The idea of “flexibility” has long been attached to comity, but the term is somewhat 
misleading: Indeed, as Adrian Briggs has argued, it suggests an understanding of comity more 
akin to “the way in which the common law reaches a conclusion which its rules do not 
otherwise allow it to find,” which is regrettable.89 Rather, comity, is “flexible” because it takes 
different shapes depending on the goals states need to accomplish. Consider the case of what is 
generally termed “legislative comity”: On the one hand, the principle mandates — or, at the 
very least — justifies the recognition of foreign law, in deference to the regulatory power of a 
foreign sovereign. On the other hand, and at the same time, it actively limits the reach of the 
law of the state acting according to comity, in an effort to avoid unreasonable interferences 
with the counterpart’s regulatory power. According to William Dodge, these are but two sides 
of the same coin:90 In other words, recognition and restraint are two faces of “prescriptive 
comity.”91 To be sure, this conclusion appears sound. What is more, it appears to be a logical 
corollary of the most authoritative statement of the doctrine, Justice Gray’s majority opinion in 
Hilton v. Guyot, where it was famously affirmed that “[n]o law has any effect, of its own force, 
beyond the limits of the sovereignty from which its authority is derived.”92 
It is possible to subscribe to this conclusion, but it must be recognized that it is premised 
on the idea that recognizing foreign law and limiting the state’s own are subject to different 
                                                
89 Briggs, supra note 4 at 87. 
90 Dodge, supra note 4 at 2079. 
91 The expression first appeared in Justice Scalia’s dissent in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California 509 U.S. 764, 817 
(1993). The adjective “prescriptive” is generally used to refer to the concept of “jurisdiction to prescribe.” See 
ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, PUBLIC LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA: CONFLICT OF LAWS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR THEIR INTERACTION (1980).  
92 159 U.S. 113, 163. For a similar phrasing in a prior decision, see Crapo v. Kelly, 83 U.S. 610, 642-3 (“According 
to my view, whilst the disposition of his movable property by the owner is respected by the laws of all States 
everywhere, the laws of any particular State and transfers by operation of law, have no extra-territorial force which 
other States will concede, except by comity.” (Bradley J dissenting)). On the status of Hilton as a the “classic 
statement” of the doctrine see Paul, supra note 11 at 27. 
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outer limits: In particular, the international law of jurisdiction plays a major role in the latter, 
but only a very minor one in the former.93  What is more, the interplay between comity and 
international law — at best, a reasonably complex matter — is rendered particularly puzzling by 
the adoption of the adjective “prescriptive,” which, while appropriate to describe their role in 
this area, tends to add to the confusion. Finally, not unlike in the case of adjudicatory comity, 
the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law provides guidance in cases concerning the 
extraterritorial application of United States law, but sheds little light on the matter of 
recognition of foreign acts. Reasons of coherence and homage to tradition suggest that the two 
issues be treated under the same heading, but due consideration should be paid to the 
dissimilarities discussed above. 
1. Using comity to grant recognition to the law and the acts of other states  
While Hilton v. Guyot remains the most well-known decision on recognition in general, 
Statements of the Supreme Court invoking comity to allow the application of foreign law and 
acts predate it by almost one full century. As early as 1797 the Supreme Court had stated that 
in Emory v. Grenough that 
the laws of one commonwealth, cannot affect the integral parts, the territory of another 
commonwealth… it cannot be done by the immediate force and operation of a foreign law, but 
with the concurring consent of the supreme power of the other government, which gives an 
effect to foreign laws exercised upon property within its own jurisdiction, without any prejudice 
                                                
93 We are restating the current understanding of the operation of the rules of public international law in this 
context, not claiming that such rules are inherently incapable of governing the recognition of foreign law. This is 
clearly not the case: Not only do a number of international instruments deal specifically with these matters, but it 
was observed as early as the 1930s that there may be cases in which the private international law requiring the 
recognition of foreign law would be overridden by the application of rules of public international law. See 
Alexander P. Fachiri, Recognition of Foreign Laws by Municipal Courts, 12 BRIT YB INTL L 95, 103 (1931). Further, 
and while a discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of the present study, certain rules of private international 
law may be — and, in fact, might have been — accorded the status of “general principles of law” in the sense of 
Article 38(1)(c) of the Status of the International Court of Justice and its predecessor, the PCIJ Statute. See Serbian 
and Brazilian Loans cases, France v. Yugoslavia; France v. Brazil (1929) PCIJ Ser A, Nos. 20–1; MILLS, supra note 19 at 
214, 230. 
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being received to its sovereignty or the rights of its citizens, regarding the mutual convenience of 
the two nations or governments, which is the foundation of all these rules. [T]hat it is not so 
much by force of law, as by the consent of the parties reciprocally communicating their rights to 
each other, by which means a change, or modification of property may arise, not less from 
matrimony than any other contract.94  
The decision, which was not immediately followed by other Supreme Court 
pronouncements invoking comity in the context of the recognition of foreign law, contains a 
statement of the doctrine almost as clear as the one contained in Hilton — indeed, all the 
elements of a traditional comity analysis are present. 
It was Justice Taney’s 1839 opinion in the domestic case Bank of Augusta v. Earle, however, 
that brought the discussion of comity even closer to Story’s theories. The decision which has 
been called “the original fountain head of the law of foreign corporations in America”95 and 
had its drafter privately applauded by Story himself, 96  referred to the Commentaries to 
strengthen the proposition that foreign companies could, lacking an express prohibition, make 
business in another state.97 Most importantly, it linked the notions of comity and sovereignty 
in the most principled manner to date: 
The comity thus extended to other nations is no impeachment of sovereignty. It is the voluntary 
act of the nation by which it is offered, and is inadmissible when contrary to its policy or 
prejudicial to its interests. But it contributes so largely to promote justice between individuals 
                                                
94 3 U.S. 369 (Dall.), 374. The case contains an extract of Huber’s De Conflictu Legum by Alexander Dallas. See 
Dodge, supra, note 11. 
95 GERARD CARL HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
A CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF JURISTIC PERSONS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 42 (1918). 
96 THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME CORUT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 1835-1864, 75. 
97 “The Court can perceive no sufficient reason for excluding from the protection of the law the contracts of 
foreign corporations; when they are not contrary to the known policy of the state, or injurious to its interests… It 
is but the usual comity of recognising the law of another state. The states of the Union are sovereign states; and 
the history of the past and the events which are daily occurring, furnish the strongest evidence that they have 
adopted towards each other the laws of comity in their fullest extent”. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 520, 
(1839). 
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and to produce a friendly intercourse between the sovereignties to which they belong that courts 
of justice have continually acted upon it, as a part of the voluntary law of nations.98  
While Earle was a domestic case, its implications were clearly visible in Canada Southern 
Railway. Co. v. Gebhard.99 This  bankruptcy case concerned a Canadian railway company that 
was reorganized through a plan agreed upon by the majority creditors and the Canadian 
Parliament, who then passed a statute to bind the minority creditors. In a suit brought by an 
American resident, and faced with the question of giving effect to the Canadian statute, the 
Supreme Court reasoned, predictably, that “the laws of a country have no extraterritorial force 
is an axiom of international jurisprudence, but things done in one country under the authority 
of law may be of binding effect in another country.”100 It followed that “every person who deals 
with a foreign corporation impliedly subjects himself to such laws of the foreign 
government.”101 Justice Harlan, however, dissented, arguing for a more nuanced analysis. In his 
view, comity was not sufficient reason to enable a foreign corporation to “benefit, in our 
courts—to the prejudice of our own people and in violation of their contract and property 
rights—of a foreign statute which could not be sustained had it been enacted by congress or by 
any one of the United States.” 102  But was it really the case? Indeed, the proposition is 
particularly interesting insofar it also echoes the domestic case Ogden v. Saunders,103 in which 
Chief Justice Marshall authored a powerful dissenting opinion — joined by none other than 
Joseph Story — arguing that the “single question for consideration” was whether the law of the 
act of discharge was repugnant to the constitution of the United States.104  
                                                
98 Id., 589 and passim. 
99 109 U.S. 527 (1883). 
100 Id. at 536. 
101 Id. at 537. 
102 Id. at 539. 
103 25 U.S. 213. 
104 Id., 332. See also Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcy Discharges, 47 YALE LAW J. 1020–1023 (1938). 
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Contrary to the enforcement of foreign judgments, it does not appear that that reciprocity 
has ever had a significant role to play with regard to the recognition of foreign law in American 
courts. It must be pointed out, however, that such matters were, too a large extent, removed 
from this sphere by the Court’s decision Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins105 and Klaxon Co. v. Stentor 
Electric Mfg. Co.,106 which put back such private international law questions firmly within the 
domain of state law.107  
2. Using comity to limit the reach of American law 
Antitrust: At the turn of the millennium, Spencer Weber Waller penned a powerful analytical 
article in which he declared that comity had entered its twilight hours.108 The principle, he 
said, was no longer important because “its advocates” had, at the same time, achieved a success 
and suffered a loss. On the one hand, the demands of comity were now more often satisfied by 
the increasingly cautious attitude of the United States in dealing with foreign interests; on the 
other hand, engaging in a comity analysis still fell severely short of being a requirement for 
courts tasked with cross-border cases.109 Most importantly, the principle had ceased to matter 
because the United States was no longer “the world’s antitrust policeman”: to Waller, comity 
had been a valuable tool, but the time was ripe to “say goodnight to an old friend.”110 
                                                
105 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (“Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the 
law to be applied in any case is the law of the state. And whether the law of the state shall be declared by its 
Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. There is no federal 
general common law.”). 
106 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (stating that “the prohibition declared in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins against such 
independent determinations by the federal courts extends to the field of conflict of laws”). 
107 On the implications of Erie on private and public international law see, inter alia, Philip C. Jessup, The Doctrine 
of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International Law, 33 AM. J. INT. LAW 740–743 (1939); Donald Earl Childress 
III, When Erie Goes International, 105 NORTHWEST. UNIV. LAW REV. (2011), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1691799 (last visited Apr 3, 2016), linking the Court’s 
approach in Klaxon “to the fact that Justice Story’s comity doctrine had been replaced by the time of Erie with 
Joseph Beale’s ”vested rights“ approach, which was influential during the first half of the twentieth century.” 
108 Spencer Weber Waller, Twilight of Comity, The, 38 COLUMBIA J. TRANSNATL. LAW 563 (1999). 
109 Id. at 565. 
110 Id. at 566. For a partially diverging assessment see KOH, supra note 29 at 60. 
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Waller has recognized a number of crucial characteristics of comity, for instance than it is 
the result of historical contingency and that it is not a prerogative of courts only. While his 
article admittedly focused on antitrust issues, it does not seem apparent from even a cursory 
review of American case law that international comity did in fact come upon its demise. 
To understand the point, it is helpful to start from the beginning. For a long time, comity 
has played a crucial role in limiting the reach of United States law. It has done so by acting as 
an upper limit to the exercise of jurisdiction or an interpretive canon capable of making sense 
of ambiguous statutes and treaties, 111  counselling restraint or a degree of intrusiveness 
depending on the interests at issue and the context. 
While previous cases might be read to the same effect, the first instance of the use of 
comity to control the extraterritorial effect of American law is traditionally found in American 
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. 112  An antitrust case, the dispute was noteworthy in that it 
concerned acts committed in Costa Rica and Panama in violation of American antitrust law. 
Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Holmes observed that the case was built on several 
“rather startling propositions,” chief among them “the fact the acts causing the damage were 
done, so far as appears, outside the jurisdiction of the United States, and within that of other 
                                                
111 An early example is provided by the Wildenhus’s Case 120 U.S. 1, 12 (1887), a case dealing with an homicide 
committed aboard a ship flying the Belgian flag. A treaty between the United States and Belgium stated that the 
jurisdiction of local courts should have been excluded for such offences “[e]xcept in the case where the peace of 
the port shall have been compromised.” Id. at 4. Faced with the question of whether this was the case, the 
Supreme Court discussed the rationale of this provision: “And so by comity it came to be generally understood 
among civilized nations that all matters of discipline, and all things done on board, which affected only the vessel, 
or those belonging to her, and did not involve the peace or dignity of the country, or the tranquillity of the port, 
should be left by the local government to be dealt with by the authorities of the nation to which the vessel 
belonged as the laws of that nation, or the interests of its commerce should require. But, if crimes are committed 
on board of a character to disturb the peace and tranquillity of the country to which the vessel has been brought, 
the offenders have never, by comity or usage, been entitled to any exemption from the operation of the local laws 
for their punishment, if the local tribunals see fit to assert their authority. Such being the general public law on 
this subject, treaties and conventions have been entered into by nations having commercial intercourse, the 
purpose of which was to settle and define the rights and duties of the contracting parties with respect to each 
other in these particulars, and thus prevent the inconvenience that might arise from attempts to exercise 
conflicting jurisdictions.” Id. at 12. 
112 213 U.S. 347 (1909). 
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states”; it was thus “surprising to hear it argued that they were governed by the act of 
Congress.”113 Citing an English landmark case114, Holmes concluded that “all legislation was 
prima facie territorial,” and with good reason too, for concluding otherwise — here, disregarding 
the role of local law in governing the legality of the acts — would have been unjust and “an 
interference with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations, which 
the other state concerned justly might resent.”115 
American Banana relies heavily on comity — the idea is pervasive, if the invocation scarce. Its 
lesson is that legislation is presumed to be territorial, though there may be cases in which it is 
not, and other ones yet where no obstacle to regulation exists because there is simply no 
sovereign to offend.116 Its legacy, on the other hand, was relatively short-lived.117 The changed 
circumstances of transnational commerce — and perhaps the awareness of a different attitude 
towards jurisdiction in international law in the wake of the S.S. Lotus decision by the 
Permanent Court of International Justice,118 which embodies the belief that states have a wide 
measure of discretion in determining the limits of their jurisdiction — brought the Court of 
Appeals of the Second Circuit (the court of last resort as indicated by the Supreme Court) to 
partially reverse this approach in United States v. Aluminum Corporation of America (“Alcoa”).119 
                                                
113 Id. at 355. 
114 Ex Parte Blain, L.R. 12 Ch. Div. 522, 528. 
115 213 U.S. 347, 357, citing Phillips v. Eyre, L.R. 4 Q.B. 225, 239. It must be observed that this English case 
introduced a two-limbed test of “double actionability” (or “criminality”), which was applied until a different rule 
was adopted in Boys v Chaplin, [1969] 2 All ER 1085. According to Koh, American Banana is as much a result of 
considerations of comity as it is of the application of rules of conflict, as the acts in question were not prohibited 
in the states where they had been committed and did not therefore satisfy the English test: see KOH, supra note 29 
at 60. 
116 213 U.S. 347, 355. See also Stephen D. Piraino, Prescription for Excess: Using Prescriptive Comity to Limit the 
Extraterritorial Reach of the Sherman Act, A, 40 HOFSTRA LAW REV. 1099, 1103 (2011). 
117  The Supreme Court held in Kirkpatrick held that American Banana had been “substantially overruled” by 
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. 370 U.S. 690, 704 (1962). 
118 SS ‘Lotus’ (France v. Turkey) (1927) PCIJ Ser. A, No. 10 253. See also KOH, supra note 29 at 59–60. 
119 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945). 
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While other decisions had progressively moved away from American Banana,120 the opinion 
was a true turning point. Writing for the Court, Judge Learned Hand affirmed that “any state 
may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its 
borders that has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends; and these 
liabilities other states will ordinarily recognize.”121 The decision does not mention comity in the 
least — though its echoes can perhaps be perceived in the discussion of the issue of 
extraterritoriality122 — and introduced a test allowing the application of American antitrust law 
to be triggered by acts committed abroad, provided that they would have been unlawful if 
committed in the United States and were intended to and actually did cause — an 
anticompetitive effect. 123  Remarkably, the decision managed to pay lip service to American 
Banana. Half a century on, a number of things can be traced back to this seminal case: The 
ideas of effects doctrine and protective principle as discussed in the Restatement; the 
“nationalist jurisprudence” that culminated in of Hartford Fire; and above all, the growing 
willingness of American courts to interfere. And yet, the significance of comity goes hand in 
hand with the potential for interference warranted by grounds of jurisdiction that can be 
understood as “virtually unbounded in scope.”124 
While early on and in certain areas the presumption against extraterritorial effect of 
American law continued to operate in the traditional fashion, 125  antitrust cases remained 
                                                
120 See United States v. Pacific & Arctic Railway & Navigation, 228 U.S. 87 (1913); United States v. Sisal Sales 
Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927). 
121 Id. at 443. 
122 Id. (“Nevertheless, it is quite true that we are not to read general words, such as those in this Act, without 
regard to the limitations customarily observed by nations upon the exercise of their powers.”). The statement was 
quoted to this effect in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976). See 
also Piraino, supra note 118 at 1105. 
123 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945). 
124 Jeffrey A. Meyer, Dual Illegality and Geoambiguous Law: A New Rule for Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law, 95 
MINN. LAW REV. 0, 151 (2010). 
125 See for example the maritime cases Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); International Longshoremen's 
Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. Allied Intern., Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982). 
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fundamentally different. The new approach was codified in the Ninth Circuit case Timberlane 
Lumber Co. v. Bank of America.126 The case generated a great deal of controversy and academic 
commentary, but for our purposes it is sufficient to mention that it introduced a tripartite 
analysis requiring “some effect actual or intended on American foreign commerce”; an effect 
“sufficiently large to present a cognizable injury to the plaintiffs and, therefore, a civil violation 
of the antitrust laws”. Most radically, it introduced the requirement of an interest of the 
United States strong enough — “including the magnitude of the effect on American foreign 
commerce” — to justify an assertion of extraterritorial authority, as the substantiality test could 
not be considered, in and by itself, “a sufficient basis on which to determine whether American 
authority should be asserted in a given case as a matter of international comity and fairness.”127 
The need to establish the existence of such an interest would have been consistent with a 
“jurisdictional rule of reason,” and required an appraisal of a number of elements such as  
the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties and 
the locations or principal places of businesses or corporations, the extent to which enforcement 
by either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance of effects on the 
United States as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to 
harm or affect American commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance 
to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct 
abroad.128 
In short, Timberlane found the solution set out in Alcoa wanting — or “incomplete, because 
it fails to consider the interests of other nations in the application or non-application of 
                                                
126 549 F.2d 597. 
127 Timberlane, 549 F.2d 597, 613. 
128 Id. at 613-614. 
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United States law”129— and introduced interest-balancing to the picture.130 What is more, it did 
so based on comity.131 It bears noting that this approach was more reflective of the Zeitgeist, as 
regulation was now to be assumed to have some extraterritorial effects,132 and its eventual 
fortune was no accident: The Timberlane interest-balancing methodology was incorporated in 
the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations law. Yet, the Restatement does not mention the 
term “comity,” perhaps “because the reporters believed that comity carries too much of the 
idea of discretion or even political judgment, as contrasted with the principle of 
reasonableness, which his conceived of in terms of legal obligation,”133 and its commentary 
seems to suggest a qualification as an international legal obligation.134 To some extent, this was 
due to the fact that the Timberlane approach had come under attack in the influential case 
Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines,135 where it was memorably held that “[i]f 
promotion of international comity is measured by the number of times United States 
jurisdiction has been declined under the “reasonableness” interest balancing approach, then it 
has been a failure.”136 In the majority opinion, Judge Wilkey found that the notion of comity 
had been stretched beyond its bounds, relying on Hilton v. Guyot to state that “comity ‘never 
obligates a national forum to ignore the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are 
                                                
129 Lowenfeld, supra note 26 at 44. 
130 549 F.2d 597, 613-614. 
131 Katherine J. Florey, State Law, US Power, Foreign Disputes: Understanding the Extraterritorial Effect of State Law in 
the Wake of Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 92 BOSTON UNIV. LAW REV., 543 (2012), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2224207 (last visited Mar 10, 2016). 
132 See for example the European Woodpulp cases, where comity arguments were raised by a number of Canadian 
applicants contending that by regulating their conduct—relating to activities performed outside of, but having 
effects within Europe—the Commission had ‘infringed Canada’s sovereignty and thus breached the principle of 
international comity. The Court swiftly dismissed the argument, stating that it amounted to questioning the 
Community's jurisdiction to apply its competition rules. See: Case C-89/85, Ahlström v Commission (Woodpulp II), 
[1993] ECR 1307. See also: Schultz and Ridi, supra note 6. 
133  Lowenfeld, supra note 26 at 52 The author does, however, note that “If agreement can be reached or 
approached on content, it may not be worthwhile continuing to debate the terminology”. 
134 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403. 
135 Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
136 Id. at 950. 
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under the protection of its laws,’”137  and remained critical of the difficulty of reconciling 
interest-balancing with the function of courts, which he urged were not “organs of political 
compromise.”138 
It was, in any event, with Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California139 that the Supreme Court finally 
seized an opportunity to discuss comity in this context again. Often hailed as a “death blow” to 
the principle,140 the case concerned the conduct taken by American and British reinsurance 
and co-insurance companies, which had conspired to limit their offering in the United States, 
with anticompetitive consequences stretching to the United States. The London reinsurers 
argued that the Sherman Act did not apply to them, and justified the claim on the basis of 
comity: The activities they had carried out, they contended, were lawful in the United 
Kingdom, which had “established a comprehensive regulatory scheme governing the London 
reinsurance markets, and clearly has a heavy “interest in regulating the activity.” 141  The 
majority, however, was relatively unmoved by the claim. In the end, the Court held — though 
by a small margin — that it was not enough for the conduct of the reinsurers to be compliant 
with foreign law when compliance with foreign and American law was possible. The Court held 
that only a “true conflict” would have imported considerations of comity in resolution of the 
dispute and, since the situation in the case at issue did not amount to one, comity was no 
ground to decline the court’s jurisdiction. 142  In the powerful dissent he penned for the 
minority, destined to be — with all its wisdom and its deficiencies — more deserving of 
doctrinal attention than the majority opinion, Justice Scalia spotted the main shortcomings of 
                                                
137 Id. at 943. This judgment may have been influenced by a seminal — and skeptical — article by Harold G. Maier, 
Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31 AM. J. COMP. LAW 579–597, 590–91 (1983) and passim. See Karl 
M. Meessen, Antitrust Jurisdiction under Customary International Law, 78 AM. J. INT. LAW 783–810, 788 (1984). 
138 Laker, 731 F.2d at 953.  
139 509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
140 Waller, supra note 110 at 564. 
141 Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 819 (Scalia J), citing Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law. 
142 In this case, the court concerned was the District Court for the Northern District of California.  
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the decision. As he observed, the question should not have been one of jurisdiction of the 
courts, but rather one “of substantive law turning on whether, in enacting the Sherman Act, 
Congress asserted regulatory power over the challenged conduct.” 143  Citing Story and his 
Commentaries, Scalia lectured on how the precedents cited by the majority did not refer to  
the comity of courts, whereby judges decline to exercise jurisdiction over matters more 
appropriately adjudged elsewhere, but rather what might be termed “prescriptive comity”: the 
respect sovereign nations afford each other by limiting the reach of their laws… comity in this 
sense includes the choice-of-law principles that, “in the absence of contrary congressional 
direction,” are assumed to be incorporated into our substantive laws having extraterritorial reach 
Considering comity in this way is just part of determining whether the Sherman Act prohibits 
the conduct at issue.144  
On this point, Scalia’s was absolutely right, and it is possibly a matter of regret that he 
would reinforce an argument built on choice of law145 with a confusing allusion to the public 
international law limits on jurisdiction to prescribe.146 As we explained, comity presupposes the 
existence of any such jurisdiction — be it to prescribe, adjudicate, or enforce. It is unsurprising 
that it was Scalia’s version that prevailed in the subsequent Supreme Court opinion F. Hoffman-
La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.,147 where it was “principles of prescriptive comity” counselled 
against the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of United States antitrust law: “[I]f America's 
antitrust policies could not win their own way in the international marketplace for such ideas, 
                                                
143 Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 813 (Scalia J). 
144 Id. at 817-8. Dodge observes — correctly — that this is not what Story meant, because in his time Courts did not 
have the authority to decline jurisdiction. cite to Dodge. This is true, but it might be added that, before 
International Shoe cite , courts did not have extraterritorial jurisdiction anyway (except, of course, in admiralty 
cases) If this detail is taken into account, Scalia’s “rhetorical flourish” does not appear to be inconsistent with 
Story’s thinking. See Dodge, supra note 4 at 2106–7. 
145 Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 818 (Scalia J) (citing, among others, Lauritzen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953)).  
146 Id. at 815-6 (Scalia J) (citing the canon of interpretation set out by Chief Justice Marshall in Murray v. Schooner 
Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of 
nations if any other possible construction remains.”)). 
147 542 U.S. 155 (2004). 
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Congress, we must assume, would not have tried to impose them in an act of legal 
imperialism.”148  
But was this a return to comity? Hartford Fire decision did strike a blow to the principle that 
is hard to understate. Consider, for instance, United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co.,149 an 
antitrust case four years after Hartford Fire: The First Circuit affirmed that comity was “more an 
aspiration than a fixed rule, more a matter of grace than a matter of obligation. In all events, its 
growth in the antitrust sphere has been stunted by Hartford Fire.”150 The conclusion in this case 
was that wholly foreign conduct having an intended and substantial effect in the United States 
could form the basis for criminal prosecution under American antitrust law, a finding hard to 
reconcile with any understanding of comity. Empagran too is not too far a stretch from Hartford 
Fire, as comity was grounds for the Court to dismiss the claims relating to alleged foreign 
damages, but not those concerning domestic harmful effects.151 In a concise article on the 
topic, Joel Paul made the argument that this conclusion is problematic in that the Court 
appeared to pay homage and deference to the market, rather than to a sovereign.152 Whether 
this was the was the case is questionable, and the idea that “[d]eference to the Market has 
nothing to do with respect for foreign law or private parties” might be criticized in light of the 
historical roots of comity.153 In these respects, the court in Empagran did attempt to strike a 
balance, but while it claimed to construe “ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable 
interference with other nations' sovereign authority,” it arguably fell short of the mark by 
leaving untouched an approach allowing for intrusive regulatory interference — rather than 
                                                
148 Id. 169. 
149 109 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997). 
150 Id., 8 (1st Cir. 1997).  
151 542 U.S. 155, 159 (2004). 
152 Joel R. Paul, Transformation of International Comity, The, 71 LAW CONTEMP. PROBL. 19, 36 (2008). 
153 Id. at 38. 
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helping, as it professed, “the potentially conflicting laws of different nations work together in 
harmony”.154  
On the whole, the “breathtakingly broad” 155 holding of Hartford Fire has made it difficult 
for courts to engage in a comity analysis where a “true conflict” cannot be identified, and it is 
possibly responsible for much terminological and conceptual confusion, so that while courts in 
subsequent cases are more critical of this approach, it is sometimes difficult to tell where 
disagreement ends and misunderstanding begins.156 
Outside the antitrust context: for a long time, comity remained relatively absent from the 
debate on extraterritoriality in cases not concerning antitrust, though similar notions were 
often cited.157 It may be argued that the absence of comity might be imputed to something 
more than mere terminological variety. For example, in the 1991 case EEOC v. Arabian 
American Oil Co. (Aramco),158 the principle was only mentioned in the dissenting opinion of 
Justice Marshall.159 This case concerned discrimination of female American workers by their 
employer, a Delaware corporation, operating in Saudia Arabia. In deciding whether the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 was applicable to the case, the Court concluded in the negative, relying on 
the presumption against extraterritoriality as a guarantee “against unintended clashes between 
our laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord.”160  
                                                
154 542 U.S. 156. 
155 509 U.S. 764, 820 (Scalia J). 
156 See, for example, Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 599 (9th Cir. 2014), affirming that the “true conflicts” 
approach is restricted to prescriptive comity and says nothing about adjudicatory comity (as in the case at issue), 
only to apply the comity considerations contained in § 403 of the Restatement, which deal with prescriptive 
comity too. See also Opinio Juris » Blog Archive The Ninth Circuit’s Muddled Comity Analysis in Mujica - 
Opinio Juris, , http://opiniojuris.org/2014/11/21/ninth-circuits-muddled-comity-analysis-mujica/ (last visited 
Mar 13, 2016); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2014: Twenty-Eighth Annual 
Survey, 63 AM. J. COMP. LAW 299, 312 (2015). 
157 See, e.g., Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949). 
158 499 U.S. 244 (1991). 
159 Id. at 260. 
160 Id. at 248 (citing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U. S. 10 (1963)). 
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More recently, the Supreme Court has employed comity to curb the territorial reach of 
United States law in a few interesting cases dealing with securities regulation and, most 
prominently, human rights.161  In Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 162  a number of foreign 
investors initiated a class action against an Australian bank alleging securities fraud. In 
delivering the Court’s opinion, Justice Scalia focused on the extraterritorial application of the 
Securities Exchange Act and concluded that the presumption against extraterritoriality applied 
“regardless of whether there is a risk of conflict between the American statute and a foreign 
law. When a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”163 
Interestingly, discussing a statement of the Solicitor General claiming that the “significant and 
material conduct” test was “in accord with prevailing notions of international comity,” Scalia 
appeared to draw the dubious inference that such an assertion of prescriptive jurisdiction, if 
there had been any, would not have amounted to a violation of international law.164  
This remark has been criticized in American scholarship on the grounds that it blurs the 
line between international law and international comity, but one wonders if the assessment is 
not too harsh.165 Indeed, the Solicitor General raised the point of conformity to comity to 
suggest that an intent of extraterritorial application would not have been illogical. Scalia was 
surely right in remarking that this was no proof that Congress had made such an assertion.166 
What is more, he was also formally correct in stating that such a conduct would have been in 
conformity to customary international law: to breach it, one must ostensibly breach comity 
                                                
161 But see also Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119 (2005), where it was held — citing the 
Wildenhus’s Case, 120 U. S. 1, 12 (1887) — that in dealing with foreign vessels comity only requires that “general 
statutes are presumed not to impose requirements that would interfere with the internal affairs of foreign-flag 
vessels.” Id. at 142. However, the Court stated unambiguously that “that general statutes are presumed to apply to 
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162 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
163 Id. at 255. 
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166 Briggs, supra note 4 at 104. 
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first, never the other way around. Ultimately, while we will never know whether this truism was 
the actual purpose of Scalia’s discussion of the issue, the resulting terminological confusion 
cannot be commended.167 
Other cases concerned claims for violation of the “law of nations” under the Alien Tort 
Statute (ATS). The leading authority in this context is Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.168 
Until a few years before the facts of the case, the ATS had been relegated as little more than a 
historical oddity. Passed as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, it granted the District Courts 
“original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of 
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”169 The Act remained forgotten until the 
early eighties, when the Second Circuit rediscovered it in the landmark case Filártiga v. Peña-
Irala,170  holding that torture amounted to a breach of the law of nations and that the ATS 
provided federal jurisdiction.171 
In Kiobel, Nigerian petitioners filed a suit against a number of corporations alleging that 
they had aided and abetted the Nigerian government in committing violations of the law of 
nations.172 The Court of Appeals had rejected the claims, reasoning that the law of nations did 
not recognize corporate liability, and certiorari was eventually granted by the Supreme Court.173 
The case, however, was resolved on other grounds, namely that the facts of the case had taken 
place outside of the United States and that nothing in the ATS rebutted the presumption 
                                                
167 On the questions of extraterritorial application of state law raised by Morrison, see Florey, supra note 133. 
168 133 S. Ct. 1659. On the history of the ATS see Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of 
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against extraterritoriality.174 In order to do so, the Court traced the evolution of the ATS back 
to its historical roots175 and considered the foreign policy implications of extraterritorial ATS 
jurisdiction in terms of interference with both other sovereign states and the executive as the 
sole responsible of the United States foreign policy. 176  In particular, the Court used the 
historical argument to claim that the prosecution of admittedly extraterritorial conduct such as 
piracy did not interfere with the preserve of other sovereigns,  and the foreign policy argument 
to reason that haling foreign defendants in United States courts for breaches of international 
law occurring abroad might have provoked the undesired result of the opposite also 
applying.177 
These conclusions seem consistent with Justice Breyer’s findings in his separate opinion in 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.178 However, in that case the Court had limited the applicability of the 
ATS to violations “specific, universal, and obligatory” norms.179 In his concurrence, Breyer 
endorsed this choice on the basis that “universal criminal jurisdiction necessarily contemplates 
a significant degree of civil tort recovery,” and the fact that universal tort jurisdiction could 
threaten “the practical harmony that comity principles seek to protect” militated in favor of a 
limited number of actionable norms.180 Accordingly, Breyer disagreed again with the Court’s 
reasoning in Kiobel: In his view, it was wrong to decide the case on the basis of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality. Rather, he stated that the ATS provided jurisdiction 
where 
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 (1) the alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is an American national, or (3) 
the defendant's conduct substantially and adversely affects an important American national 
interest, and that includes a distinct interest in preventing the United States from becoming a 
safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or other common enemy of 
mankind.181  
To Breyer and those who joined the minority opinion, to interpret the ATS this way would 
be consistent with the international law of jurisdiction and with the comity concerns of 
minimizing international friction.182 
Analysis: There can no longer be any doubt that comity plays a role in limiting the 
territorial reach of American law, though it is nevertheless distinct from the presumption 
against extraterritoriality.183 It is, however, clear from the above that the use of the principle to 
this end is not necessarily consistent. 
Let us consider, for example, the Aramco case. As Posner and Sunstein observed, “does 
Saudi Arabia really care about sex discrimination by American businesses practiced against 
American employees? Even if it does, does it care enough that the discriminatory practice 
should be tolerated?”184 The principle of comity, as it has been understood by American courts, 
does allow this type of analysis — therein lies its importance, and the reason why it was precisely 
comity that Justice Marshall mentioned in his dissent in Aramco.185 And yet, it is interesting to 
observe that the Supreme Court has been much bolder in affirming that comity was no bar to 
the exercise of extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction in the antitrust sphere than it has been 
                                                
181 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1673-4. 
182 Id. 
183 See In re Maxwell Commc'n Corp. plc by Homan, 93 F.3d 1036, 1047 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Moreover, international 
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in other significant areas, such as worker discrimination or tortious claims under the ATS.186 
True, such choices lie within the conceptual boundaries of the principle, but it is arguably 
difficult to justify a difference in treatment of anticompetitive conduct and discrimination 
against American nationals when both cause — to play with Huber’s words — “prejudice to the 
power or rights of such governments or of its subjects.” As Louise Weinberg lucidly put it 
“[t]his is a vivid example of how ‘comity’ can mean accommodation to values repugnant to this 
country.”187 
Finally, the attitude of the American judiciary suggests that we spend a few words on the 
relationship between comity and territoriality. The two concepts have always gone hand in 
hand, the former being a predicate of the latter, but always in the sense that one state should 
allow foreign law to have extraterritorial effect in its territory unless their fundamental 
domestic interests militated against it. 188  This model coherently assumes — rather than 
presumes — legislation to be territorial: to state that national interests justify a greater reach of 
the forum’s law just because they allow limitation of foreign law is stretching the theoretical 
boundaries of the paradigm. To clarify, we are not claiming that presumptively limiting the 
reach of the forum’s law to the forum’s territory is inconsistent with comity — quite the 
contrary: We observe that extending it because of the importance of domestic interests does 
not descend naturally from the principle. If anything, the point contributes to highlight the 
significance of the distinction between matters of international law of jurisdiction and comity, 
                                                
186 On the post-Kiobel landscape, see Donald Earl Childress III, Is an International Arbitral Tribunal the Answer to the 
Challenges of Litigating Transnational Human Rights Cases in a Post-Kiobel World, 19 UCLA J INTL FOREIGN AFF 31 
(2015). 
187 Weinberg, supra note 20 at 74. Speaking of the Aramco case, Weinberg notes that its result might have been “a 
practical necessity, particularly at a time when hundreds of American companies are competing for contracts to 
rebuild Kuwait.” Id. 
188 For Huber’s original statement of the doctrine, see supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
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in that state interests are the justification of exorbitant jurisdiction and comity an incentive to 
its restriction. 
B. Comity and the recognition of foreign judicial acts 
The doctrine of comity has for a long time provided the basis for the recognition of foreign 
judgments in the United States.189 In this regard, Justice Gray’s opinion in Hilton v. Guyot has 
undeniably represented “the lodestar for all transnational enforcement doctrines in the U.S.”190 
The Court famously held that comity was  
neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, 
upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the 
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international 
duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under 
the protection of its laws.191 
The case concerned the recognition of a decision rendered in a French court. The comity 
analysis in the case was partly consistent with the theories of Story and the Dutch writers, 
predicated as it was on the idea that any such recognition should have not caused harmful 
effects to the United States, its citizens, or their rights, and resulted in the rule whereby if   
the foreign judgment appears to have been rendered by a competent court, having jurisdiction of 
the cause and of the parties, and upon due allegations and proofs, and opportunity to defend 
against them, and its proceedings are according to the course of a civilized jurisprudence, and are 
                                                
189 A number of authorities have classified the recognition of foreign judgments under the heading of adjudicative 
comity. While we agree that there is merit to that view, we prefer to privilege the aspects concerning comity as a 
principle of recognition and treat it separately. For different views see Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 
F.3d 1227, 1238 (11th Cir. 2004) (“The doctrine of international comity can be applied retrospectively or 
prospectively. When applied retrospectively, domestic courts consider whether to respect the judgment of a 
foreign tribunal or to defer to parallel foreign proceedings”); Dodge, supra note 4; Childress, supra note 4.  
190 KOH, supra note 29 at 206. 
191 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). 
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stated in a clear and formal record, the judgment is prima facie evidence, at least, of the truth of 
the matter adjudged; and it should be held conclusive upon the merits tried in the foreign court, 
unless some special ground is shown for impeaching the judgment, as by showing that it was 
affected by fraud or prejudice, or that by the principles of international law, and by the comity of 
our own country, it should not be given full credit and effect.192 
The Court thus provided a principled framework for the recognition of foreign judgments. 
However, there is at least one more reason to hail Hilton as a “watershed moment in the history 
of international comity,”193 and that of abidance to the rule of reciprocity, which the Court — 
perhaps reading too much in Story’s Commentaries — placed firmly within “the structure of 
international jurisprudence.”194 The Court reasoned that “if the judgment had been rendered 
in this country, or in any other outside of the jurisdiction of France, the French courts would 
not have executed or enforced it, except after examining into its merits.” Accordingly, arguing 
on the basis that “international law is founded upon mutuality and reciprocity,” “the principles 
of international law recognized in most civilized nations, and by the comity of our own 
country,” the Court held that the judgment was not entitled to full recognition.195  
Hilton’s significance for the recognition of judgments also faded to some degree after the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Erie and Klaxon. Indeed, Hilton has been considered in contrast 
to the more efficient rules of state law,196 and the reciprocity rule denounced by courts more or 
                                                
192 Id. at 205-06. 
193 Childress, supra note 4 at 31. 
194 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 227 (1895) (citing STORY, supra note 16 at § 618. Story only observes that the 
rule of reciprocity is “a very reasonable” one. cite 
195 Hilton, 159 U.S. at 228. 
196 See, e.g., Banque Libanaise Pour Le Commerce v. Khreich, 915 F.2d 1000, 1004 (5th Cir. 1990) (“Although 
comity is not a rule of law, it is more than mere courtesy and accommodation… Under the Texas Recognition Act 
the rules relating to the recognition of foreign country money-judgments are statutory and therefore more 
predictable.”).  
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less expressly.197 In any event, even before Erie many American legal minds were aware of the 
limitations of Hilton’s reciprocity. As early as 1925, Judge Learned Hand affirmed  that  
[w]hatever may be thought of that decision, the court certainly did not mean to hold that an 
American court was to recognize no obligations or duties arising elsewhere until it appeared that 
the sovereign of the locus reciprocally recognized similar obligations existing here. That doctrine 
I am happy to say is not a part of American jurisprudence.198  
Criticism of Hilton’s model of reciprocity was in fact quite widespread.199 Perhaps the most 
compelling exposition of the flaws inherent a reciprocity analysis may be found in Judge 
Cuthbert Pound’s opinion in Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique200: 
It is argued with some force that questions of international relations and the comity of nations 
are to be determined by the Supreme Court of the United States… But the question is one of 
private rather than public international law, of private right rather than public relations and our 
courts will recognize private rights acquired under foreign laws and the sufficiency of the 
evidence establishing such rights… Comity is not a rule of law, but it is a rule of ‘practice, 
convenience and expediency. It is something more than mere courtesy, which implies only 
deference to the opinion of others, since it has a substantial value in securing uniformity of 
decision, and discouraging repeated litigation of the same question… It, therefore, rests, not on 
the basis of reciprocity, but rather upon the persuasiveness of the foreign judgment. When the 
whole of the facts appear to have been inquired into by the French courts, judicially, honestly 
                                                
197 See, e.g., De la Mata v. Am. Life Ins. Co., 771 F. Supp. 1375, 1383 (D. Del. 1991) (“[T]he court predicts that the 
Delaware Supreme Court would no longer regard reciprocity as a precondition for the recognition of a foreign 
judgment.”); Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 387 (1926) (“Comity is not a rule 
of law, but it is a rule of ‘practice, convenience and expediency… It is something more than mere courtesy, which 
implies only deference to the opinion of others, since it has a substantial value in securing uniformity of decision, 
and discouraging repeated litigation of the same question.”). 
198 Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft v. U.S. Steel Corp., 300 F. 741, 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). 
199 Disconto Gesellschaft v. Umbreit, 208 U.S. 570, 580 (1908) (“There being, then, no provision of positive law 
requiring the recognition of the right of the plaintiff in error to appropriate property in the state of Wisconsin 
and subject it to distribution for the benefit of foreign creditors as against the demands of local creditors, how far 
the public policy of the state permitted such recognition was a matter for the state to determine for itself”). 
200 242 N.Y. 381 (1926). 
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and with full jurisdiction and with the intention to arrive at the right conclusion, and when they 
have heard the facts and come to a conclusion, it should no longer be open to the party invoking 
the foreign court against a resident of France to ask the American court to sit as a court of appeal 
from that which gave the judgment. I reach the conclusion that this court is not bound to follow 
the Hilton case and reverse its previous rulings.201 
Be that as it may, comity has largely lost its role as ground upon which foreign judgments 
are recognized, at least as a common law doctrine, as the matter is now covered by Uniform 
Acts,202 which provide more straightforward solutions. It must be observed, however, that the 
doctrine has not been sidestepped completely. First of all, comity played a role for the period of 
time in which the Acts had yet to receive a homogeneous adoption by states. In a 10th Circuit 
case, it was affirmed that comity governed the recognition of foreign judgments in Utah, a state 
that had not yet adopted the Uniform Acts.203 Second, even a cursory reading of the 2005 
Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act shows as much, as its “saving 
clause” states that does not prevent the recognition under principles of comity or otherwise of 
a foreign-country judgment not within [its] scope.”204 Third, the Acts’ focus on concepts such as 
“repugnancy” and their understanding by the courts is certainly revealing of their foundation 
in comity.205 What is more, the courts have used comity as a canon of statutory construction 
for the Uniform Acts: In a 2013 case, the Ninth Circuit held that the act’s public policy 
exception did not apply “unless a foreign-country judgment or the law on which it is based is 
                                                
201 Id. at 386-87. 
202  UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (1962); UNIFORM FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY 
JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (2005). 
203 12 Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Reinhart, 402 F.3d 982, 999 (10th Cir. 2005). 
204 Id. § 11. 
205 See Wolff v. Wolff, 40 Md. App. 168, 175 (1979) (“Thus the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition 
Act was intended to promote principles of international comity by assuring foreign nations that their judgments 
would, under certain well-defined circumstances, be given recognition by courts in states which have adopted the 
Uniform Act… The Act, therefore delineates a Minimum of foreign judgments which Must be recognized in 
jurisdictions which have adopted the Act, and in no way constitutes a Maximum limitation upon foreign 
judgments which May be given recognition apart from the Act”). See also Marc P. Epstein, Comity Concerns Are No 
Joke: Recognition of Foreign Judgments Under Dormant Foreign Affairs Preemption, 82 FORDHAM REV 2317, 2321 (2013). 
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“so antagonistic to California [or federal] public policy interests as to preclude the extension of 
comity.”206 It might be added that the Uniform Acts do not, for example, cover injunctions. 
Accordingly, in Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme,207 the Ninth Circuit 
stated that “Because the Uniform Act does not cover injunctions, we look to general principles 
of comity followed by the California courts.”208 Finally, it has been argued in at least one case 
that the demands of comity might be met by requiring that non-enforceable judgments be 
granted recognition and their enforcement being left untouched.209 This is might, of course, be 
a meaningful result on its own — one may think of the res judicata effect of such a judgment — 
and exemplifies a conclusion that could not be reached by the reading of the Acts alone. 
In conclusion, comity reasoning appears to be deeply entrenched in matters of recognition 
of foreign judgments and, more generally, judicial acts. In this regard, it can be observed that 
Hilton’s legacy remains uncontested authority for the view that comity constitutes the basis for 
the recognition of foreign judgments, filling the gaps left by and fine-tuning the more detailed 
regulation of the matter by state sources. Conversely, reciprocity, while sometimes invoked as 
“relevant factor for the granting of comity,” has failed to become an essential element of a 
comity analysis in this context.210 
Indeed, the main problem of Hilton’s legacy is not connected to its definition of the 
doctrine,211 or to its linking the concept of reciprocity to the recognition of judgments, but 
rather to the way its rationale has been extended to other manifestations of comity — namely, 
                                                
206 Naoko Ohno v. Yuko Yasuma, 723 F.3d 984, 1002 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Crockford's Club Ltd. v. Si-Ahmed, 203 
Cal. App. 3d 1402, 1406 (Ct. App. 1988)). 
207 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006). 
208 Id. at 1213. 
209 Guinness PLC v. Ward, 955 F.2d 875, 889 (4th Cir. 1992) (“[W]e nonetheless believe that such goal as well as 
the principles of comity are still sufficiently served by the fact that judgments which are not enforceable might still 
be entitled, if consistent with the Act's criteria, to recognition.”). 
210 Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Servs. AB, 773 F.2d 452, 460. 
211 As Calamita put it, Hiton’s definition does convey the idea that comity “stands as a short-hand term to denote a 
collection of identifiable interests and values that must be balanced in given cases and from which rules of law 
develop.” Calamita, supra note 24 at 626. 
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those concerning applicable law and management of parallel proceedings.212 Some see Hilton’s 
continued citation where comity is invoked as a matter of regret. Childress calls Hilton’s 
treatment of the matter “woefully inadequate” because of its relinquishment of a sovereign 
interests rationale for reciprocity and an unsatisfactory foundation that “does not provide 
courts with concrete direction in applying the doctrine.” 213  As Louise Weinberg put it, 
reciprocity “is simply not as safe an item as ‘motherhood’ or ‘apple pie’.”214  
It is, however, not entirely true that the recognition of foreign judgments is entirely devoid 
of foreign relations consequences: the recent Chevron cases215 are testament to this proposition. 
As it is well known, the District Court had, acting under the recognition law of the forum 
state, granted an injunction enjoining and restraining the plaintiffs “from directly or indirectly 
funding, commencing, prosecuting, advancing in any way, or receiving benefit from any action 
or proceeding, outside the Republic of Ecuador, for recognition or enforcement of the 
judgment previously rendered.” 216  The rationale for the decision was that the judgment 
rendered under a system which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible 
with the requirements of due process of law.”217 Vacating the injunction, the Second Circuit 
held that it was a “particularly weighty matter for a court in one country to declare that another 
country’s legal system is so corrupt or unfair that its judgments are entitled to no respect from 
the courts of other nations.”218 This, if comity is to be respected, it would have been a correct 
conclusion even if the matter had been limited to the recognition of foreign judgment. The 
                                                
212 In re Maxwell Commc'n Corp. plc by Homan, 93 F.3d 1036, 1046 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Although Hilton addressed 
the degree to which a foreign judgment is conclusive in a court of the United States, the principle expressed is one 
of broad application.”). 
213 Childress, supra note 4 at 33–34; Partially against this view, see Briggs, supra note 4 at 145 ff. 
214 Weinberg, supra note 20 at 59. 
215 Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232 
(2d Cir. 2012). 
216 Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 660. 
217 Id. at 636. 
218 Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 244. 
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Court, however, was also concerned with the implications of an injunction with such wide-
ranging, global effects, as it found one such injunction to be very close to tacitly holding the 
courts of other countries “insufficiently trustworthy to recognize what is asserted to be the 
extreme incapacity of the legal system from which the judgment emanates.”219 As Briggs points 
out, solutions to these issues are not readily available: If these questions are to be resolved on 
the basis of comity, possibly infringed by any such judgment of non-recognition, the answer, 
lacking a clear, sovereign — or international law — command overriding comity considerations, 
“depends, inevitably, on what comity is.”220 
C. Adjudicatory comity, or “the comity of courts” 
Comity has also been invoked to justify certain approaches towards adjudication carried out in 
foreign countries and, to some extent, international courts and tribunals. This is an area in 
which the notion of “comity” falls close to the notion of “deference,” as these doctrines are 
clearly understood to arise not from a lack of jurisdictional power, but rather from the 
discretionary decision not to exercise one that exists — indeed, if it did not, no conflict would 
occur — for a number of reasons.221 Within the debate on the modern idea of comity, the 
notion that the principle may provide the basis for the coordination of the exercise of 
adjudicatory power, or is at least implicated in it, is usually assumed as a starting point.222 This 
role of comity, however, can hardly be taken for granted. As Campbell McLachlan observed in 
his 2009 Hague lectures on Lis Pendens in International Litigation,  
                                                
219  Id. at 244. The Court based its reasoning on New York state law. For our purposes this distinction is 
immaterial. See Epstein, supra note 207 at 2352. 
220 Briggs, supra note 4 at 141. 
221 This, of course, does not exclude the possibility that in some cases “the exercise of apparently discretionary 
rules could mask an underlying objective of compliance with international limitations on judicial authority”. See 
Alex Mills, Rethinking Jurisdiction in International Law,  BR. YEARB. INT. LAW bru003, 6 (2014). 
222 Calamita, supra note 24 at 614. 
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the early Dutch fathers of the Conflict of Laws did not, proceed to consider the application of lis 
pendens to the problem of the conflict of litigation internationally…. cases of this kind did not 
begin to tax the English courts until the nineteenth century. In any event, the application of the 
doctrine of lis pendens in the form in which Huber and Voet recognized it would have required a 
much stronger form of comity than they had otherwise accepted for the effects of foreign legal 
systems. It was not merely a matter of courts giving effect to foreign law and foreign judgments. 
Rather, it would have required the court to cede the power of adjudication to a foreign court.223 
This latter problem has traditionally represented the most significant hurdle: Indeed, it is 
one thing to accept that acts issued by a foreign court must be entitled to recognition insofar as 
they accord with the fundamental policies of forum state; to concede that the same respect 
should be granted to mere proceedings might sound to some as crossing the Rubicon of judicial 
abdication. To be sure, adjudicative comity encompasses a wide range of hypotheses and not all 
of them call for the same reactions. Dismissing local proceedings when none are pending 
before a foreign court is not the same as doing so when they have been instituted and a clash is 
inevitable. Different yet is the case of anti-suit injunctions issued for the purposes of frustrating 
the effects of potential or actual foreign parallel proceedings. As Briggs observed, these cases do 
not have the same implications for comity.224 Yet, comity does have a role to play in all of 
them. According to William Dodge, it does so by informing doctrines of abstention “deferring 
to foreign courts by restraining the exercise of U.S. courts’ jurisdiction.”225   
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1. The origins of adjudicatory comity in admiralty courts and the use of forum non 
conveniens 
Before the Supreme Court’s decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,226 the jurisdiction 
of American Courts was understood to be strictly territorial. On the other hand, the 
jurisdiction of admiralty courts was without limitations. This was by design as the interests of 
justice so demanded in many cases, most importantly in those brought by seamen for their 
wages or injuries suffered during employment.227 And yet, taking jurisdiction in such cases 
often meant holding a ship in an American port, an action liable to be perceived as an 
unjustified interference by the flag state.228 In this regard, a choice to decline jurisdiction 
echoed comity concerns. As one early case put it,    
upon the one hand the courts are not without ample power to hear and determine such suits, 
when the circumstances of the case before them seem to render it fit that they should do so; 
while, upon the other hand, they are not bound to do this, but will, in general, from motives of 
international comity, of delicacy, and of convenience, decline the suit.229  
One way the courts addressed this problem was through the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens.230 Forum non conveniens is a common law doctrine which results in the “discretionary 
power of a court to decline to exercise a possessed jurisdiction whenever it appears that the 
cause before it may be more appropriately tried elsewhere.231 The “plea” of forum non conveniens 
                                                
226 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
227 Alexander M. Bickel, Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens As Applied in the Federal Courts in Matters of Admiralty, 35 
CORNELL LAW Q. 12, 19 (1949). 
228 Id. at 21.  
229 Davis v. Leslie, 7 F. Cas. 134, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1848). 
230 Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 464 (1994) (Kennedy and Thomas Js dissenting) (“From the 
beginning, American admiralty courts have confronted this problem through the forum non conveniens doctrine.”). 
231 Paxton Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUMBIA LAW REV. 1–34, 1 
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probably originated in Scotland 232  and was further developed in English courts. 233  The 
doctrine, however, is largely unknown to civil law systems, though it might — after having 
suffered a significant blow234  — be in the process of being rediscovered under the Recast 
Brussels Regulation.235 
While the relationship between comity and forum non conveniens is generally complex 
throughout the common law tradition,236 it is particularly so in the American context: As early 
as 1929, Paxton Blair wrote that while it was “a principle of exceptions to the doctrine of 
comity,”237 employing forum non conveniens in a particular case “does not involve ignoring the 
requirements of comity; on the contrary in some cases only by doing so can the requirements 
of comity be met.”238 The argument has also been made that the doctrine does not fully accord 
with comity: on the one hand, a decision to dismiss local proceedings in favor of a different 
forum entails an evaluation of the comparative suitability of a foreign court239; on the other 
hand, if the proceedings before the foreign court have not already been initiated, a decision by 
                                                
232  The Atlantic Star Atlantic Star (Owners) v. Bona Spes (Owner) [1974] A.C. 436 (per Lord Reid) (“The 
appellants’ counsel first referred to the law of Scotland, where for a very long time the plea of forum non 
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jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters OJ L 351, 
20.12.2012, p. 1–32, articles 33 and 34. 
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& Jason Mitchenson, Navigating Sovereignty and Transnational Commercial Law: The Use of Comity by Australian 
Courts,  FORTHCOMING. 
237 Blair, supra note 233 at 33. 
238 Id. at 6. 
239 This aspect has implications of a certain magnitude in international adjudication, where it might be considered 
in tension with the principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz — that is, the principle that a tribunal is capable of 
adjudicating on its own jurisdiction. See Schultz and Ridi, supra note 6; MCLACHLAN, supra note 62 at 454. 
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the local court not to exercise jurisdiction may amount to “dumping” cases — that is, telling 
another court what to do.240 
Indeed, while after International Shoe American courts swiftly understood the significance of 
the doctrine, the Supreme Court did not link forum non conveniens and comity in its first 
decisions on the matter, though it must be noted that the Court’s main concern was to 
overcome the constitutional hurdles to its application. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,241 the Court 
did not play down the constitutional duty to exercise jurisdiction; rather, it held that “[t]he 
principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its 
jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute.”242 By 
the same token, comity remained, with few exceptions, notably absent from the Supreme 
Court’s discussion of the doctrine for a long time, with very few timid mentions as 
exceptions.243 
If lower courts have more often considered the two concepts together, they have largely 
done so for the purpose of distinguishing one from the other in the most ambiguous cases. In 
Laker, the D.C. Circuit observed that the interest supporting the grant of anti-suit injunctions 
enjoining the parties from commencing proceedings abroad were to be balanced with comity 
principles requiring respect for the judicial function of the foreign court.244 Accordingly, the 
avoidance of “hardship to parties” and the promotion of “economies of consolidated 
                                                
240 Briggs, supra note 4 at 119. 
241 330 U.S. 501 (1947). 
242 Id. at 507. According to Calamita, this conclusion followed from the contention that congressional grants of 
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COMITY: THE NARRATIVE AND INFLUENCE OF A CORE AMERICAN CONCEPT 
 50 
litigation” would have been better pursued by a motion for dismissal on grounds of forum non 
conveniens. In other cases, comity and forum non conveniens have been discussed together, but 
stressing that they were considered as alternative grounds for dismissal of the same suit.245 
However, connection between the two is drawn insofar as the procedural necessity of showing 
that an alternative and suitable forum exists might is imposed by the circumstance that a court 
is precluded by comity from passing judgment on a foreign court.246  
Yet, forum non conveniens is regarded as much narrower a ground for dismissal than comity. 
As the Second Circuit put it in Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc.,  
[i]t may well be that a plaintiff that is precluded from litigating a matter in a foreign jurisdiction 
because of an adverse earlier judgment by its courts will not be able to pursue the claim further 
in the United States, but the reason for dismissal in such circumstances is our recognition of the 
foreign judgment in the interest of international comity, not forum non conveniens.247  
Most importantly — and this truly is the core of the problem — forum non conveniens may be 
considered much narrower than comity because its focus on sovereign interests is less 
significant. True, it can be argued that it is comity is the basis of the recognition of the “local 
interest in having localized controversies decided at home.”248 Further, one fails to see how any 
such distinction could be understood from the phrasing of Scalia’s famous dissent in Hartford 
Fire, which defined the “comity of courts” as declining “to exercise jurisdiction over matters 
more appropriately adjudged elsewhere”. 249  It must, however, be observed that comity analysis, 
                                                
245 Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, at 951 (11th Cir. 1997). 
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while sometimes recognized as “ultimately intertwined with the forum non conveniens 
calculus,”250 is generally regarded by the courts as separate.251 
2. Comity as a coordination device for pending or potential parallel proceedings 
While “[c]oncurrent jurisdiction does not necessarily entail conflicting jurisdiction,” 252 
differences and tensions do arise from parallel adjudication of the same or similar disputes in 
different countries. Comity has served as a powerful tool to resolve this problem by providing 
exceptions to the “virtually unflagging obligation” of American Courts to exercise their 
jurisdiction.253  
This is particularly common in bankruptcy cases. As the Second Circuit put it in Cunard 
S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Servs. AB,254 this promoted efficiency insofar as 
[t]he granting of comity to a foreign bankruptcy proceeding enables the assets of a debtor to be 
dispersed in an equitable, orderly, and systematic manner, rather than in a haphazard, erratic or 
piecemeal fashion. Consequently, American courts have consistently recognized the interest of 
foreign courts in liquidating or winding up the affairs of their own domestic business entities.255 
The grant of comity, however, was not automatic, but subject to certain conditions. In 
Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Linter Grp. Ltd,256 the same Court set out a number of factors as “indicia 
of procedural fairness,” including    
(1) whether creditors of the same class are treated equally in the distribution of assets; (2) 
whether the liquidators are considered fiduciaries and are held accountable to the court; (3) 
                                                
250 Ford v. Brown, 319 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 2003). 
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whether creditors have the right to submit claims which, if denied, can be submitted to a 
bankruptcy court for adjudication; (4) whether the liquidators are required to give notice to the 
debtors' potential claimants; (5) whether there are provisions for creditors' meetings; (6) whether 
a foreign country's insolvency laws favor its own citizens; (7) whether all assets are marshalled 
before one body for centralized distribution; and (8) whether there are provisions for an 
automatic stay and for the lifting of such stays to facilitate the centralization of claims.257 
As the same Court held years later, comity is thus afforded “to foreign bankruptcies only if 
those proceedings do not violate the laws or public policy of the United States.”258 
These conclusions reflect an understanding of comity which is largely derived from Hilton. 
It follows that the same logic governing the recognition of judgments applies, to a significant 
extent, to the question of deference to foreign proceedings. Outside of the bankruptcy context, 
the Eleventh Circuit openly admitted as much in Turner Entm't Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH,259 
eventually concluding that comity concerns included 
 (1) whether the judgment was rendered via fraud… (2) whether the judgment was rendered by a 
competent court utilizing proceedings consistent with civilized jurisprudence, see id.; and (3) 
whether the foreign judgment is prejudicial, in the sense of violating American public policy 
because it is repugnant to fundamental principles of what is decent and just.260  
Interestingly, however, the Court went further, adding that “the relative strengths” of the 
two countries’ interests were also relevant to the comity analysis: In the case at issue, the Court 
relied on this point to conclude that Germany had a greater interest to the determination of 
the dispute.261 Complications may, of course, arise. For example, in Jota v. Texaco, Inc.262 the 
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Second Circuit dealt with a shift in the position of the other sovereign party involved, Ecuador, 
which first opposed and then advocated for the jurisdiction of United States courts.263 
The existence of governmental interests is considered vital for the purposes of comity-based 
abstention. In Royal & Sun All. Ins. Co. of Canada v. Century Int'l Arms, Inc.264 it was held that 
[c]ircumstances that routinely exist in connection with parallel litigation cannot reasonably be 
considered exceptional circumstances, and therefore the mere existence of an adequate parallel 
action, by itself, does not justify the dismissal of a case on grounds of international comity 
abstention. Rather, additional circumstances must be present—such as a foreign nation's interest 
in uniform bankruptcy proceedings—that outweigh the district court's general obligation to 
exercise its jurisdiction.265 
The Court reached its conclusion by reference to the Supreme Court’s dictum that 
“[a]bstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule.”266 Yet, 
even the circuits that do not follow this approach adopt a similar methodology when 
confronted with parallel proceedings pending abroad. For example, in Ungaro-Benages v. 
Dresdner Bank AG, 267  the Eleventh Circuit drew a line between the situations where the 
application of the comity doctrine has a “retrospective” character and those in which it is 
“prospective”:  
When applied retrospectively, domestic courts consider whether to respect the judgment of a 
foreign tribunal or to defer to parallel foreign proceedings… When applied prospectively, 
                                                                                                                                                  
Comity may also explain the reasoning in Bi v. Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Co., 984 F.2d 582 (2d Cir.1993) 
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domestic courts consider whether to dismiss or stay a domestic action based on the interests of 
our government, the foreign government and the international community in resolving the 
dispute in a foreign forum… Applied prospectively, federal courts evaluate several factors, 
including the strength of the United States' interest in using a foreign forum, the strength of the 
foreign governments' interests, and the adequacy of the alternative forum.268  
Accordingly, a “retrospective” approach is warranted when proceedings are already pending 
before another forum. It is only before proceedings are initiated that a “prospective” approach 
may apply. Ungaro-Benages concerned a suit by a descendant of the heir to a German company 
against German banks that, the plaintiff claimed, had stolen the stock belonging to Jewish heirs 
in aryanization processes. In 2000, President Clinton entered into an agreement with Germany 
to establish a foundation to hear claims from victims of the Nazi regime. The Eleventh 
Circuit found that the United States’ support for the Foundation as the exclusive forum for 
such claims, along with the German government’s interests “in having the Foundation be the 
exclusive forum for these claims in its efforts to achieve lasting legal peace with the 
international community,” and the adequacy of the Foundation as a forum all supported 
dismissal.269  
In some cases, the very act of adjudication of a dispute might be regarded, in and by itself, 
as extremely unfriendly act. Indeed, “extreme cases might be imagined where a foreign 
sovereign's interests were so legitimately affronted by the conduct of litigation in a United 
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States forum that dismissal is warranted without regard to the defendant's amenability to suit 
in an adequate foreign forum.”270 
These might be cases in which a court is concerned about the far reaching effects of 
entertaining a suit with foreign relations implications. All the same, such implications might 
have to be balanced with the policies of the forum state. Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co.,271 a Second 
Circuit case, concerned Canadian citizens who alleged that the unlawful expropriation of their 
Egyptian corporation by the Egyptian government was carried out because of their Jewish 
lineage. The corporation was later acquired by a Delaware company, which the plaintiffs 
proceeded to sue on the grounds that it had done so in full knowledge of the unlawfulness of 
the expropriation.272 The Court responded to a plea of dismissal on grounds of comity that 
“the only issue of international comity properly raised here is whether adjudication of this case 
by a United States court would offend ‘amicable working relationships’ with Egypt.”273 In the 
case at issue, the Court could hold that comity did not justify dismissing the local proceedings 
by reference to the fact that the Egyptian Government had “never raised the slightest objection 
to adjudication of the instant controversy by United States courts” and its prior determination 
that  “resolution of this case by United States courts will “not likely impact on international 
relations.”274  
However, a different situation was faced in Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd.,275 a suit 
brought under the Alien Tort Statute by South African plaintiffs claiming that the defendants 
had “actively and willingly collaborated with the government of South Africa in maintaining 
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the apartheid regime.276 The case was an extremely political one, with statement of interests by 
the government of both countries involved.277 Without delving into the complicated history of 
the case,278 the case is notable because the District Court eventually held on remand that 
“[i]nternational comity comes into play only when there is a true conflict between American 
law and that of a foreign jurisdiction.”279 The Court further held that even if there was a “true 
conflict,” 
the decision whether to dismiss on comity grounds depends on the degree of legitimate offense 
to the foreign sovereign, steps the foreign sovereign may have taken to address the issues in the 
litigation, and the extent of the United States' interest in the underlying issues.280 
The Court further observed that  
[t]he absence of conflict between this litigation and the TRC process is fatal to the argument that 
international comity requires dismissal. The TRC process was not exclusive—by its terms, only 
upon a grant of amnesty was the right of “victims and/or their families to institute criminal 
and/or civil proceedings… Plaintiffs have now come to this Court to exercise their rights. 
Defendants do not argue—and South Africa has not claimed—that “an adequate forum exists in 
the objecting nation”… Nor does this litigation conflict with the goals of the TRC process; thus it 
is not an “extreme case” requiring dismissal even without the existence of an alternative forum 
for the plaintiffs’ claims.281  
The problem with this reasoning is evident: As Childress has observed, it was not quite 
clear from Hartford Fire that a true conflict analysis should guide adjudicatory comity cases.282 
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Even if it did, it is arguable that it should focus on a conflict between sovereign — something 
that a Hartford Fire type of reasoning does not seem to allow. 
This point was precisely one of the most critical issues of the recent Ninth Circuit decision 
in Mujica v. AirScan Inc.,283 hailed by many as a missed opportunity that contributed to further 
confusion on the issue. This too was an action brought under the Alien Tort Statute and the 
Torture Victim Prevention Act, this time by Colombian nationals against an American 
corporation and its private security firm, for the defendants’ alleged complicity in the 
bombings of their village.284  No other proceedings were pending elsewhere and the Court 
relied on adjudicatory comity to dismiss the claims, and engaged in a thorough review of the 
relevant case law to determine whether the doctrine was applicable and what the best standard 
should be.285 The Court concluded — by any measure, correctly — that “Hartford Fire does not 
require proof of a “true conflict” as a prerequisite for invoking the doctrine of comity, at least 
in a case involving adjudicatory comity”.286 It reached this conclusion by reading a number of 
precedents to this effect,287 and ultimately expanded the Eleventh Circuit’s test developed in 
Ungaro-Benages to formulate its own. In particular, where the latter test focused on “the United 
States’ interest in using a foreign forum, the strength of the foreign governments' interests, and 
the adequacy of the alternative forum,” 288 the Court in Mujica attempted to clarify the first 
element with the prescriptive comity factors the same Court had considered in Timberlane, and 
which made their way into § 403 of the Restatement. The Court held that they constituted “a 
general list of indicia to which we may look when weighing U.S. and foreign interests and the 
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adequacy of the alternative forum.”289 This choice has been harshly criticized, and it has been 
observed that such an analysis seems to be the result of a misunderstanding.290 Yet, a second 
look reveals that the most important component of the Court’s comity analysis might have 
been the deference granted to the Executive’s Statement of Interest, thus seriously downplaying 
the significance of the other elements in the picture.291  
3. Anti-suit injunctions 
Finally, a few words must be spent on the topic of anti-suit injunctions. These may be 
considered the flipside of forum non conveniens and comity-based abstention doctrines insofar as 
their need arises when a court does not dismiss the local suit in favor of foreign proceedings. 
Contrary to the English tradition, where “[i]t is easy to take anti-suit injunctions for granted,” 
American Courts have on the whole granted the remedy sparingly.292 That federal courts have 
the power to grant them is not at all controversial.293 It has long been recognized, however, that 
“the power to enjoin a party before it from pursuing litigation before a foreign tribunal… often 
effectively restricts the jurisdiction of the foreign tribunal and should therefore be used 
sparingly.”294  
Indeed, the grant of an anti-suit injunction can be a delicate matter: While English courts 
and writers often justify their existence with the need to enforce an agreement not to bring 
proceedings before a foreign court, there is good evidence for the proposition that the remedy 
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does interfere with the sovereign act of adjudication — though the extent to which it does, 
depending on whether a foreign court has or has not been seized at the time of the injunction, 
might be a matter of degrees.295 American Courts, on the other hand, are generally more 
mindful of the implications of any such gesture. As early as 1849, the Supreme Court held in 
Peck v. Jenness296 that “[t]he fact… that an injunction issues only to the parties before the court, 
and not to the court, is no evasion of the difficulties that are the necessary result of an attempt 
to exercise that power over a party who is a litigant in another and independent forum.”297 In 
other words, courts granting such injunctions too liberally would raise serious comity 
concerns.298 
This conclusion reflects the belief that “[c]oncurrent jurisdiction does not necessarily entail 
conflicting jurisdiction” — a statement that holds true with reference to both jurisdiction to 
prescribe and to adjudicate.299 Accordingly, concurrent proceedings represent the rule, and, 
since “they are ordinarily tolerable, the initiation before a foreign court of a suit concerning the 
same parties and issues as a suit already pending in a United States court does not, without 
more, justify enjoining a party from proceeding in the foreign forum.”300  In other words, 
parallel proceedings normally represent a necessary condition for the grant of the remedy, but 
seldom suffice alone, even when their concurrence might produce an “embarrassing race to 
judgment” and “potentially inconsistent adjudications.” 301  Indeed, comity considerations 
militating against the grant of anti-suit injunctions are no minor hurdle: The Sixth Circuit 
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referred to the issuance of such an order as “a drastic step.”302 The First Circuit, too, held as 
much in the often-cited decision in Quaak v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler Bedrijfsrevisoren,303 
where it held that “considerations of international comity must be given substantial weight — 
and those considerations ordinarily establish a rebuttable presumption against the issuance of 
an order that has the effect of halting foreign judicial proceedings.”304 
To some extent, the grant of anti-suit injunctions tends to follow the same logic of the 
recognition of judgments and, even more closely, comity-driven abstention doctrines.305 While 
conceding that no hard and fast rules were available, the D.C. Circuit observed that  
[t]he equitable circumstances surrounding each request for an injunction must be carefully 
examined to determine whether, in light of the principles outlined above, the injunction is 
required to prevent an irreparable miscarriage of justice. Injunctions are most often necessary to 
protect the jurisdiction of the enjoining court, or to prevent the litigant's evasion of the 
important public policies of the forum.306  
Over the years, the Ninth Circuit has elaborated a more principled — and seemingly less 
conservative307 — approach to anti-suit injunctions, based on a three-pronged test, which the 
court described in full in the 2012 case Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc.308 First, the court must 
consider whether the parties and the issues are the same and “whether or not the first action is 
dispositive of the action to be enjoined.” Second, the court must determine whether the 
foreign litigation would 
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(1) frustrate a policy of the forum issuing the injunction; (2) be vexatious or oppressive; (3) 
threaten the issuing court's in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction; or (4) where the proceedings 
prejudice other equitable considerations.309 
Finally, the court must assess whether the injunction's “impact on comity is tolerable.”310 In 
this regard, the Court in reasoned that there are significant differences between cases where the 
enforcement of a choice of forum agreement is sought — unlikely, in principle, to infringe 
comity — and those politically sensitive situations in which foreign relations implications are 
expected, and perhaps even an object of a governmental statement of interest.311 For those 
cases situated at neither end of the spectrum, the comity analysis may take into account other 
elements, such as whether such as whether the plaintiff initiated the foreign suit at a later 
moment for seemingly abusive purposes.312  
Irrespective of the differences between circuits, it is easy to understand how the doctrine of 
comity governs the grant of anti-suit injunctions. In broad terms, the two main grounds to 
grant them are the protection of a court’s own jurisdiction and the prevention of abusive 
forum selection designed to escape fundamental American policies. The first ground explains 
the more relaxed attitude in granting the remedy for in rem or quasi-in rem actions. As it was 
held in a Sixth Circuit case,  
“[w]here jurisdiction is based on the presence of property within the court's jurisdictional 
boundaries, a concurrent proceeding in a foreign jurisdiction poses the danger that the foreign 
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court will order the transfer of the property out of the jurisdictional boundaries of the first court, 
thus depriving it of jurisdiction over the matter”.313 
The second is a public policy ground, and in that it does not differ much from the 
phenomenon of recognition of foreign judgments. The latter, as the D.C. Circuit put it in 
Laker, is a strict standard, but that governing anti-suit injunctions is even stricter in recognition 
of the much greater inference with the judicial process of another country.314 An evasion of 
public policy warranting the remedy cannot thus be found in “the availability of slight 
advantages in the substantive or procedural law,”315 such as, for example, the unavailability of a 
treble damages remedy.316 Interestingly, courts instead grant anti-suit injunctions because they 
frustrate a United States policy favoring forum selection clauses317 and “the liberal enforcement 
of arbitration clauses.”318  
D.  “Executive” or “sovereign-party” comity 
There is one more type of comity, which has traditionally been assigned the confusing label of 
“executive.”319 The adjective has been employed to convey the idea that this type of comity is 
intended to command deference “with regard to the executive acts of foreign countries,”320 and 
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usually identifies the Act of State doctrine, foreign sovereign immunity and the privilege of 
foreign governments to bring suit in United States courts. Whether the expression achieves its 
objective is, however, doubtful at best: In fact, this terminology adds to the confusion 
stemming from the likely involvement of the Executive Branch in the cross-border affairs that 
normally justify the use of such types of comity. To avert the problem, William Dodge has 
proposed the alternative definition of “sovereign party” comity, meant to identify those cases 
where deference is given to foreign governments as litigants.321 This choice too is problematic, 
as it comes with the corollary of not covering the Act of State doctrine, which Dodge classifies 
as a principle of recognition under the heading of prescriptive comity.322 
For our purposes, the distinction is not of disproportionate consequence. Accordingly, we 
acknowledge the difficulty in capturing the essence of these doctrines and adopt, for reasons of 
intelligibility, the traditional approach of grouping the three of them together under the same 
heading.  
1. The Act of State Doctrine 
The “Act of Act of doctrine” requires American courts not to question the validity of an act 
concluded by a foreign government in its territory. For greater precision, as the Court put it in 
First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, “the doctrine precludes any review whatever 
of the acts of the government of one sovereign State done within its own territory by the courts 
of another sovereign State.”323 The classical statement of the doctrine is generally understood to 
be contained in the 1897 decision Underhill v. Hernandez, where the Supreme Court affirmed 
that  
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[e]very sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and 
the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done 
within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through 
the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.324 
The doctrine has traditionally been considered to stem from considerations of international 
comity, and justifiably so. As the Supreme Court put it, “[t]o permit the validity of the acts of 
one sovereign state to be reexamined and perhaps condemned by the courts of another would 
very certainly imperil the amicable relations between governments and vex the peace of 
nations.”325 But what does comity require in this context? The answer is not as straightforward 
as is sometimes argued. 
It has been suggested that the interests to be protected by the doctrine have changed, 
moving from mutual convenience, to respect for sovereignty, and, finally, consideration for the 
foreign relations interests of the United States and prerogatives of the political branches.326 The 
foreign relations element of the doctrine is particularly evident in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. 
Sabbatino, where the Court considered a dispute arising from an expropriation by the Cuban 
government to the detriment of an American company, made all the more interesting by the 
circumstance that the suit was brought by the former.327 The defendant had argued that this 
element, along with the fact that the expropriation was to be considered unlawful under 
international law, would have rendered the doctrine inapplicable to the case.328 The Court, 
however, held otherwise, stating that  
                                                
324 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). 
325 Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 304 (1918).  
326 DODGE, supra note 31; Paul, supra note 11 at 31. 
327 376 U.S. 398. 
328 Indeed, this hypothesis is now covered by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964 (amended 2000) (28 U.S. Code § 
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[t]he doctrine as formulated in past decisions expresses the strong sense of the Judicial Branch 
that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of state may hinder 
rather than further this country's pursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of 
nations as a whole in the international sphere.329 
In this context, comity serves as the basis of the rule.330 This respect for other sovereign 
entities, though, is not just a textbook definition of comity itself, but rather a consequence of 
precise policy determinations. It is precisely in this way that courts begin to pay deference, 
rather than to the acts of a foreign state as such, to these policy concerns and to the branch of 
government best suited to pursue them: the Executive. 331  The Court expanded on these 
conclusions twice. In First National City Bank, it confirmed that the act of state doctrine, much 
like sovereign immunity, 332  was “judicially created to effectuate general notions of comity 
among nations and among the respective branches of the Federal Government.” 333  The 
corollary of this statement was that the doctrine was not meant to be “inflexible,” but rather as 
malleable as the needs of the executive required. In the case at issue, the Executive Branch had 
“expressly stated that an inflexible application of the act of state doctrine by this Court would 
                                                
329 376 U.S. 398, 423. 
330 Though, according to Ramsay, “the fact that conflict with foreign territorial acts carries strong foreign policy 
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Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 725-26 (1976). 
333 First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 762 (1972). 
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not serve the interests of American foreign policy.”334 By the same token, the application of the 
rule out of deference would have been illogical if the interested party — the Executive — had 
counselled otherwise.335 According to Koh, “by explicitly linking the Act of State Doctrine to 
separation of powers, Sabbatino implied that determinations regarding the legality of foreign 
state acts are quasi-political questions, whose decision is appropriately confided in the 
Executive.”336  Almost two decades later, Kirkpatrick337 offered an opportunity to discuss the 
shifting foundations of the doctrine. In its opinion, delivered by Justice Scalia,338 the Court was 
unambiguous in describing it as “a consequence of domestic separation of powers, reflecting 
“the strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the 
validity of foreign acts of state may hinder” the conduct of foreign affairs,” thus confirming the 
first part of the comment above.339 And yet, while no question was made expressly of the need 
to defer to the Executive, a reading of Kirkpatrick suggests a narrower interpretation of the Act 
of State doctrine: it may only be employed when there is one specific act of state, and that the 
act has bearing on the outcome of the dispute is less obvious a remark than might appear at 
first glance.340 In other words, the underlying policies giving rise to the doctrine cannot, by 
themselves, give rise to the application of the doctrine lacking an act of the foreign government 
the validity of which is at issue: The “embarrassment” of any government is either devoid of 
any relevance, or in any event fails, in and by itself, to constitute a sufficient reason for a court 
to decline its jurisdiction.341 
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For our purposes, the way the doctrine operates need not be clarified further: But what is, 
then, the function of comity in this context? In a recent study, William Dodge has argued that 
the Act of State doctrine should not be classified as a form of “executive comity,” but must on 
the contrary be understood as constituting a principle of recognition, a species of prescriptive 
comity. The remark is not devoid of merit, but tends to describe the result of the doctrine 
rather than its basis, and happens to be no news at all. As the Court noted in Sabbatino, “[t]he 
act of state doctrine… although it shares with the immunity doctrine a respect for sovereign 
states, concerns the limits for determining the validity of an otherwise applicable rule of 
law.”342 In other words, while the end product of the rule is the recognition of a foreign act, the 
fact that this recognition may extend to manifestly unlawful actions does render the element of 
respect for foreign states and relations preponderant.343 Further, as the Court put it in First 
National City Bank,  “the act of state doctrine justifies its existence primarily on the basis that 
juridical review of acts of state of a foreign power could embarrass the conduct of foreign 
relations by the political branches.”344 True, Kirkpatrick has, at the very least, mitigated the 
significance of comity for the use of the doctrine — and indeed, as far as its application is 
concerned, Joel Paul is absolutely correct in observing that “[t]he risk of embarrassing the 
executive is a curious rationale for a conflicts principle.” 345  The point is that, if 
“embarrassment” belongs within the semantic spectrum of comity, the contrary is not 
necessarily true. In fact, the comity that explains the origin of the act of state doctrine — it was 
through comity that American courts created the doctrine in their quest to “accommodate 
                                                
342 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 411. 
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respect for foreign sovereignty with growing American intercourse with other nations”346 — is 
very much the same comity that remains relevant for the modern-day life of the institution. In 
other words, comity, intended as a tool to promote successful political and commercial 
relations, supports the idea of deference to the Executive, assumed as the branch capable of 
best pursuing these objectives. 
2. Sovereign immunity 
Doctrines of sovereign immunity have long been recognized to be founded on comity. True, 
the early landmark case The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, often labelled as “[t]he classic case 
illustrating the relationship between territorial jurisdiction and sovereign immunity,”347 does 
refer to comity as such.348 While affirming that [t]he jurisdiction of the nation within its own 
territory” was “necessarily exclusive and absolute” and “susceptible of no limitation not 
imposed by itself,” Chief Justice Marshall observed that exceptions did exist, though they 
ultimately had to be traced to the consent of the nation, “either express or implied. In the 
latter case it is less determinate, exposed more to the uncertainties of construction, but if 
understood, not less obligatory.”349 Marshall’s skillful and balanced language in putting forward 
an exception to sovereignty while reaffirming its absoluteness, 350  along with his oblique 
reference to the language of the law of nations,351 have somehow diminished the significance of 
comity elements in the case.352 And yet, these elements were clearly there: 
the world being composed of distinct sovereignties, possessing equal rights and equal 
independence, whose mutual benefit is promoted by intercourse with each other and by an 
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interchange of those good offices which humanity dictates and its wants require, all sovereigns 
have consented to a relaxation in practice, in cases under certain peculiar circumstances, of that 
absolute and complete jurisdiction within their respective territories which sovereignty confers.353 
A number of authorities, American and foreign, support the proposition that the The 
Exchange was founded on comity. In the English case The Parlement Belge, for example, the 
Court of Appeal cited the American decision to support the proposition that  as “a 
consequence of the absolute independence of every sovereign authority and of the 
international comity” sovereign states should decline to exercise territorial jurisdiction. 354 
When a similar case reached the House of Lords in 1938, Lord Maugham relied on The 
Exchange to state that “the word ‘comity,’ whatever may be its defects in regard to other rules of 
private international law, has a very powerful significance” in the context of immunity.355  
Again, the relation between comity and immunity was addressed in Guaranty Trust Co. v. 
United States, where it was held “that upon the principle of comity foreign sovereigns and their 
public property are held not to be amenable to suit in our courts without their consent.”356 The 
relation was further addressed in Justice Reed’s dissent in City Bank of New York v. Republic of 
China,357 where he asserted that any consent to a relaxation of jurisdictional rules could, “in 
some instances, be tested by common usage, and by common opinion, growing out of that 
usage.”358 To Reed, the word “comity” represented as good a shorthand as any to describe the 
whole phenomenon; further, it called to mind the idea that the sovereign could easily revoke 
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any such consent.359  Indeed, there exist examples in which the severance of diplomatic 
relations was considered sufficient grounds to deny the invocation of immunity by a foreign 
government.360 However, it was in Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria361 that a definitive 
interpretive statement clarifying the basis of immunity: “As The Schooner Exchange made clear… 
foreign sovereign immunity is a matter of grace and comity on the part of the United States, 
and not a restriction imposed by the Constitution.” 362  For the Court, this circumstance 
justified the consistent deference to the political branches in determining whether it was 
appropriate to exercise jurisdiction against foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities.363 
The point was further expanded upon in Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson,364 where the court held 
that the purpose of foreign sovereign immunity was to give “states and their instrumentalities 
some protection from the inconvenience of suit as a gesture of comity between the United 
States and other sovereigns.”365 Interestingly, comity was invoked in First National City Bank v. 
Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba 366  to rule that duly established government 
instrumentalities were presumed to have independent status. Citing Hilton v. Guyot, the 
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decision affirmed as much based on “[d]ue respect for the actions taken by foreign sovereigns 
and for principles of comity between nations.”367  
More recent cases seem to rely on comity to a lesser extent, but its importance still seem to 
be significant. In Republic of Austria v. Altmann,368 a case dealing with an action under the FSIA, 
the court referenced comity and discussed its role in shaping the doctrine of immunity at 
length, but the concept does not appear to have played a major role in the solution of the 
case. 369  Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel, 370  though, paints a different picture: The case 
concerned a litigation in which the Republic of the Philippines and the Philippine Presidential 
Commission on Good Governance had invoked immunity, but the lower courts had allowed 
the litigation to proceed with regards with the other parties. In delivering the opinion of the 
Court, Justice Kennedy criticized the approach and held that  
[t]he District Court and the Court of Appeals failed to give full effect to sovereign immunity 
when they held the action could proceed without the Republic and the Commission. Giving full 
effect to sovereign immunity promotes the comity interests that have contributed to the 
development of the immunity doctrine.371 
The conclusion is particularly interesting, because it resulted in a different interpretation of 
Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This interpretation was in turn mandated by 
comity, the operation of which required a broader conception of immunity.372 
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3. The privilege of suit 
Finally, comity has traditionally served as the traditional justification for the privilege granted 
to foreign governments to bring suit in United States Courts. As early as 1870, Justice Bradley 
affirmed as much in delivering the opinion for an unanimous Court in The Sapphire373:  
The first question raised is as to the right of the French Emperor to sue in our courts. On this 
point not the slightest difficulty exists. A foreign sovereign, as well as any other foreign person, 
who has a demand of a civil nature against any person here, may prosecute it in our courts. To 
deny him this privilege would manifest a want of comity and friendly feeling… The Constitution 
expressly extends the judicial power to controversies between a State, or citizens thereof, and 
foreign States, citizens, or subjects, without reference to the subject-matter of the controversy. 
Our own government has largely availed itself of the like privilege to bring suits in the English 
courts in cases growing  out of our late civil war.374 
The decision relied heavily of comity, more so than the precedent that the Court cited, 
where the basis for allowing a sovereign’s suit was grounded solely in the Constitution.375 One 
consequence of this approach to granting of the privilege, of course, was the ability to preserve 
“the discretion of the United States to deny it, at least to foreign states that are at war with the 
United States or not recognized by it.”376 While this conclusion is not clear from the wording 
of the decision, this is certainly the conclusion that was reached in later cases.377 But the 
privilege of suit, in this regard, differs fundamentally from immunity. As the Court put it in a 
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later case, “[b]y voluntarily appearing in the role of suitor it abandons its immunity from suit 
and subjects itself to the procedure and rules of decision governing the forum which it has 
sought.”378 Interestingly, the issue of privilege of suit was later raised in a case which dealt with 
a question of statutory interpretation. In Pzifer the Court clarified whether a sovereign state 
damaged by anticompetitive conduct could sue for treble damages in United States district 
courts.379 The question ultimately came down to whether sovereign states qualified as persons 
under the Clayton Act, 380  which the Court answered in the affirmative, responding to a 
vigorous dissent of the Chief Justice by invoking the hoary rule of the privilege of suit and its 
basis in comity.381 
It has been argued that comity, the roots of the privilege notwithstanding, has now a much 
smaller role to play, and that questions concerning suits brought by foreign governments can 
be resolved by clear-cut — if judge-made — rules, as opposed to standards.382 But as a less dated 
Second Circuit decision puts it, reliance on comity highlights “that foreign nations are external 
to the constitutional compact, and it preserves the flexibility and discretion of the political 
branches in conducting this country's relations with other nations.” 383  The Act of State 
doctrine, sovereign immunity and the privilege of foreign governments to bring suit in United 
States courts all have their basis in comity. But is the role of comity still significant? While 
other elements may play a role, what lies beneath the surface reveals a more complex reality.  
First of all, it must be observed that the comity basis of these doctrines also provides a 
convincing explanation to the problem of deference to the political branches of the 
government: Indeed, such deference is intended to increase the odds of successful conduct of 
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foreign relations, especially where sensible matters were implicated, and thus mutual 
convenience. It is worth recalling that comity — much like smooth talk — was never there for its 
own sake. Whether the doctrines “reflect not a concern about entanglement” or “a rough 
consequentialist judgment on the part of the federal courts”384 really does not make that much 
of a difference. Be that as it may, the idea of deference to the Executive and the separation of 
powers rationale always reflected385 and still reflects serious policy concerns, also echoed in how 
the doctrine developed off of American soil.386 
Be that as it may, it appears that American courts have less discretion at their disposal. 
Kirkpatrick has significantly restricted the operation of the Act of State doctrine; a 
comprehensive set of rules governs immunities after “Congress abated the bedlam in 1976, 
replacing the old executive-driven, factor-intensive, loosely common-law-based immunity 
regime.”387 It is precisely with this in mind that Harold Koh writes about “a decline in the 
deference shown by U.S. courts to foreign sovereignty.”388 Let us consider again the examples 
made above: It is clear that Kirkpatrick limits the operation of the Act of State doctrine, but it is 
not quite evident from the decision that, necessity of a tangible act of state aside, no instance 
of foreign embarrassment should be covered by the doctrine.389 Much in the same way, the 
FSIA has been found not to be as all-encompassing as some may have thought, thus leaving 
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open the possibility of common law foreign sovereign immunity effectively barring a suit.390 To 
some extent, this description matches Dodge’s suggestive picture of “an international law ‘core’ 
and a comity ‘penumbra’,” though it is certainly true — as Dodge concedes — that many 
phenomena are regulated by comity alone.391 
The better view appears to be that comity, though relegated to an ancillary role, remains a 
widely invoked and discussed concept in the case law of American courts dealing with the three 
doctrines discussed above and maintains its value as an interpretive principle.  
V. UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE AND THE GLOBAL DIMENSION OF COMITY  
In the foregoing sections we have examined the approach American courts and scholars have 
adopted when dealing with the concept of comity. It is now time to understand its peculiarities 
and overall fortune in the global discourse on the notion. 
A. Comity doctrines and comity reasoning 
An analysis of the notion of comity in American law does not simply highlight the variety of 
meanings that are commonly associated with the expression; rather, the most striking finding is 
perhaps the sheer number of doctrines and rules which in comity find their rationale. Through 
an examination of references to comity, we have found that the notion is taken into account in 
a variety of settings, such as the limitation of the reach of foreign law, the management of 
competing proceedings, the grant of foreign immunity or of the privilege to suit to foreign 
states or persons acting in official capacity. It is difficult to drive out the impression that, today 
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as in Huber’s time, comity has been to judges “a springboard from which they proceeded to 
develop a highly organized and sophisticated set of choice of law rules.”392  
True, as Donald Childress has convincingly observed, American courts have largely lost 
touch with the conflict of laws roots (and rationale) of the comity doctrine, which would 
provide “a more principled basis for applying the doctrine in transnational cases by bringing 
sovereign interests to light” and allowing for a more reasoned mediation between them.393 And 
yet, other factors must be taken into account, First, reliance on a “conflict of laws” rationale 
might be useful and appropriate for the resolution of certain types of clashes between sovereign 
interests, but one wonders if the development of international law might have left any space for 
this approach in questions such as, for example, immunity. Secondly, the possibility should be 
entertained that courts have quite different things in mind when they think about such clashes, 
and possibly not the greatest clarity on the matter — the antitrust cases discussed above serve as 
a striking example. But what is, then, the significance of comity in the resolution of modern 
cross-border disputes? How is it possible to reconcile its nature and origins with modern 
decision-making?  
While fundamentally accurate and evocative of the original roots of the doctrine, the 
metaphor of “comity as a springboard” does not fully describe its role in American law. We 
need not enter discussions on whether its demands are met by the application of rules or 
standards — indeed, while the distinction is undoubtedly relevant, it is of no consequence for 
our purposes.394 What we submit is that comity often enters the picture in a more oblique 
manner than it is generally suggested, and that what we may label “comity reasoning” is as 
important as the reliance on the “principle” or “the doctrine” of comity.  
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One illustration is offered by the numerous references to comity in the context of decisions 
involving international law. To a number of commentators, American courts have consistently 
struggled to distinguish one from the other. There is certainly truth to this claim, but the 
American judiciary might have received disproportionately bad press. In fact, in many cases, it 
appears that courts have simply used the concept of comity as lens through which they were 
required to ascertain what exactly international law permitted or required. 395  As Jörn 
Kämmerer observed, the idea that the interpretation of norms of international law may draw 
inspiration from comity is not theoretically illogical, especially if comity’s theoretical vicinity 
with the principle of good faith is taken into account.396 When these aspects are considered, 
the cogency of comity appears in another light: Statements to the effect that “the king is wise 
and good”397 clearly work much better in the context of domestic statutory interpretation than 
they do with regards of international sources. In other words, there might be method in the 
American judiciary’s apparent confusion of comity and public international law, in that the 
former allows American courts to give proper effect to the latter. 
B. The problem of deference to the executive 
The debate on comity in the United States has often turned into a discussion on separation of 
powers. It should be clear by now that comity — as a doctrine, as a theoretical construct — is 
largely agent-agnostic in terms of which among the powers exercises it. Not only does this 
observation find solid grounding in Huber’s own statement of the doctrine, where it was 
simply stated that the rectores imperorum — the sovereigns — were to act comiter, “according the 
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rights acquired within the limits of a government retain their force everywhere.”398 Indeed, it 
also accords with the rationale of many canons of statutory interpretation, first and foremost 
the presumption against extraterritoriality, which assumes comity to have been exercised by the 
legislative branch, the role of the judiciary being limited to an ex post recognition of such 
exercise. Yet, by looking at the instances in which comity has been invoked and the issue of 
deference to the Executive raised, one would not conclude that the problem of separation of 
powers fits so neatly in the life of the doctrine. In fact, it is arguable that the most troubling 
links between comity and deference to the executive stem from sensitive matters arising from 
cross-border or international disputes. 
This conclusion seems obvious, but it need not be: indeed, comparable occurrences before 
courts of other nations have not prompted courts to grant the political branches such a 
substantial degree of deference.399 More precisely, a more limited number of hypotheses call for 
this type of deference, which is, conversely, deeply rooted in American legal thinking and 
continues to encourage one of the most unbending “myths” of international comity.400 Indeed, 
this difficulty has less to do with questions relating to the United States form of government 
than with certain attitudes of the American judiciary, divided — when dealing with issues of 
foreign affairs — between the opposed approaches of a “customary” practice of judicial 
abdication401 and their constitutional “province and duty… to say what the law is.”402 Further, 
contrary to obsequiousness to the will of Congress, deference to the Executive could also be 
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seen as undermining the principle of democratic accountability, and the advocacy of Executive 
power in this area is linked to the growing fear of the “Soviet threat.”403 As Curtis Bradley has 
persuasively observed, the main problem with the hoary problem of deference is that it has 
been traditionally perceived as a unitary phenomenon, when in fact it cannot be labelled as 
such.404  
While there appears to be no reason why a court cannot be invested of an issue having 
cross-border significance and conduct its comity analysis, where needed, alone, it goes without 
saying that common sense and institutional courtesy limit this kind of behavior, and the 
argument that at least some deference should be given to the Executive appears quite 
compelling: But how to explain and conceptualize a framework for deference?  
It has been suggested that borrowing the doctrine of Chevron 405  deference from 
administrative law could be particularly fruitful. 406  Broadly speaking, the Chevron doctrine 
requires courts to engage in a two-step analysis in the interpretation of statutes, first  
determining whether Congress has spoken clearly on the question at issue, and then giving 
deference to the reading put forward by the governmental agency tasked with administration of 
the statute itself, insofar as it is permissible.407 The rationale for this deference is that “[j]udges 
are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the Government,” 
while agencies are both better placed and more politically accountable — if only through the 
Chief Executive.408 
With comity in mind, reliance on the Chevron rationale can be either hailed as a helpful 
contribution or criticized as an unnecessary and problematic complication: The truth probably 
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stands somewhere in between and, most importantly, is highly context-dependent. Indeed, the 
Executive’s interpretation of a treaty is not the same thing as relying on its determination as to 
whether the Act of State doctrine should not be applied, or a foreign head of state granted 
immunity from jurisdiction.409 The concept of deference is clearly not unitary.410 And as far as 
comity is concerned, William Dodge has persuasively argued that deference to the executive is 
highly inappropriate wherever the doctrine comes down to “the core responsibility of the 
courts to manage their dockets and decide cases.”411 We understand Dodge’s argument as 
mostly based on the domestic dimension of separation of powers; we restrict ourselves to 
appending a minor observation on the international dimension of the phenomenon, noting that 
deference to the executive in circumstances such as, for example, the recognition of foreign 
judgments and acts, the whole area of adjudicatory comity, could — in itself — be perceived by 
foreign sovereigns as revealing of a want of comity.  
Beyond this aspect, the involvement of the executive need not, in and by itself, be 
considered incompatible with the doctrine of comity on the international plane, though the 
extent to which it is defensible is a matter of degrees and balance. To bring this further, we may 
consider the role of deference within the broader framework of “foreign relations law,” a legal 
category that sounds rather unfamiliar to those writing from other shores of the Atlantic, but a 
well-established one in the United States.412 As McLachlan, of one of the few non-American 
lawyers who has devoted considerable attention to the field, put it, foreign relations law 
performs an “allocative function.”413 As the author contends, this function is an aggregate of 
two different ones, in that it controls the jurisdiction and applicable law “in the external 
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exercise and control of the public power of states” and contributes to the ordering of “the 
allocation of foreign affairs competence within the municipal constitution.”414 This allocative 
function obeys a conflict of laws logic: However, while conflict involves determinations on 
jurisdiction and applicable law that follow a “two-dimensional” approach considering two 
systems of municipal law, foreign relations law implicates a “three-dimensional” judgment on 
the allocation of institutional competence.415 In the United States, foreign relations law is a 
fundamentally internal matter and reflects the American Constitution’s structural aspects. It 
follows that constitutional prerogatives of the Executives make it so that deference is, if not 
always necessary, justifiable. To this extent, whether this is compatible with the Courts’ 
“judicial duty to know and to declare” the “comity of our own country” is probably a 
question.416 
 On the one hand, the Executive may appeal because of its expertise and accountability417; 
on the other hand, there may be questions of legitimacy and fear of being led onto a short-term 
focused agenda with potentially harmful long-term consequences. 418  But above all, Dodge 
rightly observes that “[e]ach opportunity for deference invites pressure from foreign 
governments and creates the possibility of diplomatic backlash if the Executive decides not to 
support their positions.”419 In this regard, the pattern established in limiting the reliance on 
executive determinations in the areas of foreign sovereign immunity supports the proposition 
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that the “government need not, and should not, speak in every case.”420 As then Legal Adviser 
to the Department of State Harold Koh’ put it, “[i]n domestic litigation, [the Department’s] 
ultimate goal is, in fact, not more verbiage, but more silence.”421 
 
C. Beyond the domestic: the “comity of courts” as a global ordering principle  
In 1998, in the wake of Breard v. Greene 422  and the provisional measures issued by the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Case concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations, 423  Anne-Marie Slaughter penned a seminal essay on the American Journal of 
International Law in which she discussed the implications of the Supreme Court’s decision not 
to accord a stay of execution in compliance with the World Court’s order. 424  Slaughter 
observed that, irrespective of whether the measures issued by the ICJ were binding,425 the 
Supreme Court should have nonetheless honored the request “as a matter of judicial 
comity.”426 In this essay and her subsequent work, Slaughter observed that the United States 
judiciary was re-discovering the concept of “judicial comity,” building the case on the basis of 
Scalia’s dissent in Hartford Fire. It has been long argued that “the comity of courts” terminology 
left much to be desired, but it most certainly provide an opportunity for Slaughter to describe a 
number of approaches and attitudes as driven by comity, and comity as “the lubricant of 
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transjudicial relations.”427 Slaughter’s understanding of “judicial comity” later evolved as one of 
the building blocks of the theoretical model she developed in later writings for the 
construction of a global legal system through the concerted work of domestic courts. In A New 
World Order she described it as providing  
… the framework and the ground rules for a global dialogue among judges in the context of 
specific cases. It has four distinct strands. First is a respect for foreign courts qua courts, rather 
than simply as the face of a foreign government, and hence for their ability to resolve disputes 
and interpret and apply the law honestly and competently. Second is the related recognition that 
courts in different nations are entitled to their fair share of disputes—both as co- equals in the 
global task of judging and as the instruments of a strong “local interest in having localized 
controversies decided at home.” Third is a distinctive emphasis on individual rights and the 
judicial role in protecting them. Fourth, although seemingly paradoxically, is a greater willingness 
to clash with other courts when necessary, as an inherent part of engaging as equals in a common 
enterprise.428 
To be sure, Slaughter’s claims have sometimes been portrayed as vaguely starry-eyed: Most 
notably, while acknowledging that conflict between courts is inevitable, she argues that it is 
conducive to greater dialogue, and thus comity.429  As Alex Mills and Tim Stephens have 
observed, such a claim relies on the notion that “the ‘special’ character of courts” and “a 
capacity of a free market of legal ideas to avoid distortions caused by inequalities of power” will 
allow substantive conflict avoidance through agreed procedure.430 Yet, Slaughter’s theory has 
proved fascinating to many, especially to those scholars and practitioners who dealt with the 
most informal of all legal regimes, that of public international law. In the context of 
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fragmentation of international law and its “institutional side,” 431  the proliferation of 
international courts and tribunals, it has been often argued that comity might have the 
potential of mitigating the resulting problems.432 The practice of international adjudication and 
arbitration too seems to provide a number of indications that international courts and 
tribunals are conscious of the value of comity, and respect each other’s competence and 
decision-making capacity, displaying an awareness of their status as “co-equals in the global task 
of judging” and recognizing different specializations.433 This attitude seems to transcend simple 
institutional dialogue,434 rather amounting to “an emerging general principle of international 
procedural law.”435 Indeed, there are indications that comity has served as a valuable tool even 
when dealing with competing proceedings before courts of different orders.436 
Reasons of space and context prevent us from examining these aspects in further detail. We 
restrict ourselves to observing that the roots of the global comity discourse are, in both its real-
world and theoretical dimensions, unmistakably American.437 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Centuries after Westphalia, sovereignty and territoriality still hold their significance as 
fundamental notions in the global ordering of regulatory authority. Despite proclamations of 
their absolute value, they remain — as they have always been — relative notions. Their 
evolution, informed by change and tensions, has, time after time, resulted in troubled waters 
where the safest course has often been inspired by the comity doctrine. Indeed, the 
development of the doctrine in the United States has shadowed these changes, rendering 
comity a lens through which a world of competing sovereignties could be better understood, 
and a source of techniques to be employed with the results of such a theoretical analysis. 
Comity has gone on to become deeply embedded in the American legal mindset and 
vocabulary, but it has also transformed, adapting to the needs of a different type of sovereignty 
— that of a super power, unafraid of most things, never mind an extraterritorial assertion of 
jurisdiction. But if the force of comity has faded as a jurisdictional constraint, that is, on the 
international plane, its significance at the domestic level has remained substantial. In that 
respect, comity has gone beyond its nature of conflict of laws principle and has become a fully-
fledged tenet of foreign relations law, conveying constitutional concerns of separation of 
powers and contributing, in addition to its external dimension, to the domestic element of the 
“allocative function” of this area of the law.  
To be sure, the concept remains elusive and difficult to define unambiguously. But, if “the 
definition of comity may be tenebrous, its importance could not be more clear.”438 This article 
has sought to show how American courts have invoked the concept for a variety of purposes, 
some fitting the original theoretical foundations of the doctrine, and some others going 
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beyond; we have tried to highlight the most representative examples of comity-based reasoning 
to illustrate how entrenched the doctrine is in the way American judges and scholars think; we 
have elected to partially distance ourselves from the perspective of private international law to 
frame the discourse on comity in the broader framework of foreign relations law, endeavoring 
— to our mind, successfully — to make sense of the peculiarity of the American experience; 
finally, we have discussed how the American experience on comity has proved influential and 
helped construe the doctrine as a theoretical construct capable of mitigating conflict between 
regimes fundamentally different from interstate ones, such as the ones between the 
jurisdictions of international courts and tribunals. 
When all is said and done, it is perhaps true that comity plays a smaller role today than it 
did two hundred years back. Critics of the doctrine have always conceded that it was never 
really forgotten by the American legal world and in this study we acknowledge as much, but we 
also demonstrate how its use is as lively as ever. True, comity has undoubtedly 
“transformed.”439 This transformation, though, is not an indication of the doctrine’s demise: In 
fact, it confirms its relevance, in light of the incapacity of its corollaries, sovereignty and 
territoriality, to deal with the challenges of the 21st Century — an incapacity that affected the 
discourse far beyond legal scholarship 440  Comity, in other words, still represents an 
unparalleled “springboard” from which a number of inferences relating to regime conflict can 
be drawn.441 
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